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Abstract 
This dissertation examines three health and development issues in Sub-Saharan Africa. It 
analyzes the impact of policy changes and interventions on child mortality, household food con-
sumption and cesarean section births. The study is motivated by the Millennium Development 
Goals and policies which could affect their achievement. In the first essay, I investigate the impact 
of debt relief on under-five mortality rate. A dynamic panel data estimator is employed in the 
analysis. The result shows that debt relief is associated with a statistically significant reduction in 
under-five mortality rate. I conclude that conditionality of debt relief or development aid can yield 
positive outcomes. The second essay examines the impact of private hospitals on the likelihood of 
cesarean section births in Uganda. The study is motivated by the increase in cesarean section births 
following the proliferation of private hospitals. The main method of estimation is a bivariate probit 
model. The results show that delivery at private hospitals increases the probability of cesarean 
section births, thus there is need to monitor private hospitals so that expectant mothers are pro-
tected from physician induced demand for avoidable cesarean section births. The final essay stud-
ies the impact of agricultural extension services on household food consumption in Uganda. The 
study exploits the variation in participation in the NAADS to estimate the impact of the program 
on household food consumption. I find that NAADS membership and training are associated with 
an increase in household food consumption, hence agricultural extension services can be used to 
reduce food insecurity.   Policy recommendations and future studies are explored.
1  
    
Chapter 1: Health and Development in Africa: An Introduction 
 Economic Development and the Millennium Development Goals  
Measurement of economic development remains a controversial issue due to its multidi-
mensional nature. The Basic Needs Approach emphasizes access to minimum needs such as health, 
food, shelter, and education among others (Singh, 1979), but it has been criticized for its concen-
tration on consumption.  The capability approach, on the other hand, emphasizes freedom and the 
ability of individuals to achieve the kind of life they value (Sen, 1985). Some of the components 
of capability and basic needs have been incorporated into various metrics of development includ-
ing the Human Development Index .The Human Development Index (HDI) is an aggregate meas-
ure of economic development based on life expectancy at birth, education, and gross national in-
come per capita. 
 The average HDI for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the lowest among all regions (Melber, 
2013), however there are concerns about the use of the HDI as a measure of progress (McGillivray 
and White, 1993; Sagar and Najam, 1998; Anand and Sen, 2000; Leigh and Wolfers, 2006).  This 
is because of the fact that HDI is not comprehensive and does not consider distributional issues as 
well as the inputs which influence the indicators.  More inclusive measures of development such 
as the Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), the Gender Development Index 
(GDI), and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) have been developed to address the short-
comings of the HDI. But like all indices, they still suffer the problems associated with composite 
measures and aggregations.  
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It appears that measuring economic development on a single index remains controversial. 
It may be informative to analyze each indicator of human development on their own merits. In 
September 2000, the United Nations Millennium summit resolved to reduce extreme poverty with 
set targets to be met by 2015. These targets became known as the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). The MDGs set quantitative objectives for a number of indicators such as poverty, hunger, 
diseases, shelter, gender inequality, child health, maternal health, education, and environmental 
sustainability.  SSA is afflicted by most of the problems targeted by the MDGs.  Improvement in 
each of the targets would signal improvement on one dimension of human development and wel-
fare. For instance, if households can afford to have regular and nutritious foods, welfare could be 
improving. Similarly, reduction of child mortality rate and maternal mortality rate may signal bet-
ter healthcare provision.  In this way, progress on human development can be tracked and appro-
priate interventions can be implemented to improve specific indicators. This dissertation is orga-
nized on the theme of the MDGs with major focus on hunger, under-five mortality rate and mater-
nal health in SSA. The focus on these topics is premised on the fact that a well fed population 
ensures effective labor supply necessary for economic growth.  Furthermore, the survival of chil-
dren ensures that the next generation of workers are available to sustain economic growth.  Hence, 
the dissertation analyzes interventions and policy changes in relation to under-five morality rate, 
maternal health, and hunger as components of the MDGs and economic development in general.   
 
 Statement of Research Problem 
Each of the three essays in this dissertation answers a research problem under the unified 
theme of the MDGs. To make the essays tractable, I state the research problem for each essay.  The 
first essay analyzes the impact of debt relief on under-five mortality rate (U5MR) in SSA. The 
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Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative involved cancelation of external debt of the 
world’s poorest countries. This was meant to reduce the debt burden of poor countries and enable 
them focus on poverty reduction and the provision of social services.  Healthcare is one of the 
social services which could be impacted by the additional resources released by debt relief initia-
tive. Whereas increased resources are necessary for the provision of healthcare services, it may 
not necessarily yield better health outcomes. This essay examines the impact of debt relief on 
under-five mortality rate as one indicator of health outcomes and a component of the MDGs.  
The second essay investigates the impact of hospital types on cesarean section births. MDG 
number 5 is concerned with improvement in maternal health. Following the implementation of the 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), many private hospitals sprung up in developing coun-
tries.  Hospitals and physicians influence maternal health through the supply of maternal healthcare 
services. In health economics literature, it is noted that healthcare services are provided amidst 
information asymmetry and principle-agent relationships due the fact that physicians and hospitals 
have better information through their specialization and experience. They are in a position to in-
fluence the demand for the services they offer. This can lead to supplier induced-demand which 
could impact the decisions of healthcare consumers. In the case of maternal health, physicians/hos-
pitals can influence the choice of method of delivery which in turn impacts health outcomes such 
as maternal mortality and infant health. The study focuses on Uganda where the rate of cesarean 
section births have been rising and there is public concern about cost and health outcomes of moth-
ers who deliver through the procedure. The increase in cesarean section births was experienced 
after the increase in the number of private hospitals following the implementation of SAPs in the 
1990s.  I examine whether hospital type influences the likelihood of cesarean section birth in 
Uganda. 
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 The third essay investigates the impact of agricultural extension services on household 
food consumption in Uganda. Poor households in many developing countries often face hunger. 
The first Millennium Development Goal emphasizes the need to reduce abject poverty and hunger. 
This requires a number of interventions geared towards raising farm output. In Uganda, the Na-
tional Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) is one of the programs setup to empower farmers 
to demand agricultural extension services and technologies suited to their needs.  It is a complete 
change from the top-bottom approach to agricultural extension service provision to a demand 
driven mode.  This study examines whether households which participate in the NAADS program 
experienced welfare improvement in terms of increased food availability/consumption. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
a) The first objective is to test whether the amount of debt forgiven under the HIPC Initiative 
have had any statistically significant impact on under-five mortality rate in SSA. This is 
met by estimating the coefficient of debt relief per capita using a dynamic panel data (DPD) 
estimator. 
b) The second objective of the dissertation is to examine the impact of conditionality and 
participation in the HIPC initiative on under-five mortality rate. This is tested using a dy-
namic panel data (DPD) estimator. The coefficient of a dummy variable indicating HIPC 
participation is the estimate of major interest.  
c) The third objective of the study is to provide an alternative microeconomic explanation of 
supplier-induced demand for cesarean section births.  This is achieved through a theoretical 
derivation based on plausible assumptions. 
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d) The fourth objective of the dissertation is to empirically test the impact of privately owned 
hospitals on the likelihood of cesarean section births in Uganda. This objective is achieved 
through application of bivariate probit regressions.  
e) The fifth objective of the dissertation is to estimate the impact of agricultural extension 
services on household food consumption in Uganda. This is achieved through application 
of fixed effects, propensity score matching, and negative binomial regressions. 
 
1.4 Testable Hypotheses  
From the research problems stated in subsection 1.2, the following are the testable null hypotheses.  
1. H0:   The HIPC debt relief initiative had no impact on under-five mortality rate in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
2. H0:    The likelihood of cesarean section birth is not influenced by hospital types in Uganda. 
3. H0:     Household food consumption is not impacted by agricultural extension services in 
Uganda. 
 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
The geographical scope of the study is limited to Sub-Saharan Africa. The choice of scope 
hinges on my interest in examining development challenges and opportunities in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica. SSA is one of the poorest regions and often attracts a lot of attention and intervention from 
international development organizations, thus inducing a need to evaluate some of the interven-
tions using robust econometric techniques.  The first essay on debt relief and under-five mortality 
follows a macroeconomic approach.  The remaining two essays follow a microeconomic approach 
and applied microeconometrics with a focus on Uganda. 
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1.6 Major Findings 
i. Participation in the HIPC debt relief initiative is associated with a decrease in under-five 
mortality rate in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
ii.  The amount of debt relief has no statistically significant impact on under-five mortality 
rate in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
iii. The probability of a cesarean section birth increases with delivery at private hospitals. 
iv.  Information asymmetry and household wealth influences physician induced demand for 
cesarean section births. 
v. Households’ participation in agricultural extension service increases food consumption in 
Uganda. 
 
1.7  Contributions and Relevance of the Study 
The dissertation addresses three development issues (child mortality, food availability and 
maternal health) in relation to the MDGs. The results from this study can be of policy relevance in 
the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the successors of the MDGs. 
The results from the analysis of the HIPC Initiative and child mortality indicates that poor countries 
in SSA can be assisted to improve welfare. This requires some degree of conditionality such as the 
ones used to determine eligibility for debt relief.  The study also shows that conditionality can be 
incentive-compatible when development aid is being provided. Therefore, appropriate condition-
ality in international development aid is not necessarily bad. 
 The second unique contribution of this dissertation is the study of physician-induced de-
mand in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is the first study which analyzes the impact of private hospitals 
on the likelihood of cesarean section using data from Africa. While there has been an increase in 
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the number of private healthcare providers in Africa, regulation remains weak. This exposes pa-
tients and expectant mothers to health risks and avoidable medical bills. The results from the anal-
ysis of physician-induced demand for cesarean section births indicates the need for closer moni-
toring of private hospitals in order to protect less informed patients . This may safeguard expectant 
mothers from the harms associated with avoidable cesarean section births.   
The third essay provides empirical evidence about the impact of demand-driven agricul-
tural extension services on food consumption. The positive impact of the NAADS program in 
Uganda shows that training farmers in modern farming methods can reduce food insecurity.  The 
government can strengthen the program so that extension services meet farmers’ needs. 
 
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
Although I applied a number of robustness checks, there are some caveats that should be 
borne in mind.  In the study of the impact of debt relief on under-five mortality rate, it was not 
possible to disaggregate the debt relief amounts which were channeled to the healthcare sector and 
child survival programs. The identification of the parameter relies on econometric methodology.  
The second study on cesarean section births excludes births which took place outside hos-
pitals/clinics.  This limits the sample size and makes it difficult to identify self-selection into ce-
sarean section births. The use of controls such as distance to the nearest hospital and differential 
distance between public and private hospitals addresses part of endogeneity problem.  The impos-
sibility of separating patient-initiated cesarean section births from medically necessary ones on the 
one hand, and physician-induced cesarean section births on the other remains a challenge. This 
information could only be obtained by interviewing the mothers who gave birth at the various 
hospitals. Due to confidentiality reasons, the survey data does not provide information which can 
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be used to identify and trace respondents. The limitation of the third study on food consumption 
and NAADS is largely due to the way the frequency of food consumption is measured. The infor-
mation was collected through interviews and the reliability of the data depends on the recall of the 
respondents. This could result in understatement or overstatement of the frequency of meals in the 
households. Secondly, the quantity and nutritional content of the food consumed by households 
could not be ascertained with the available information. Households may have increased food con-
sumption but if the foods are not nutritious, welfare and labor productivity may not improve sig-
nificantly. 
 
1.9 References 
Anand, S., & Sen, A. (2000). The Income Component of the Human Development Index. Journal of Human Development, 1(1), 83-106.  Leigh, A., & Wolfers, J. (2006). Happiness and the Human Development Index: Australia is Not a Paradox. Australian Economic Review, 39(2), 176-184.  Melber, H. (2013). The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World. New York. UNDP-HDRO Human Development Reports.  McGillivray, M., & White, H. (1993). Measuring Development? The UNDP's Human Develop-ment Index. Journal of International Development, 5(2), 183-192.  Sagar, A. D., & Najam, A. (1998). The Human Development Index: A Critical Review. Ecological Economics, 25(3), 249-264.  Sen. A. (1985). Commodities and Capabilities, Amsterdam: North-Holland.  Singh, A. (1979). The ‘Basic Needs’ approach to development vs the new international economic order: The significance of Third World industrialization. World Development, 7(6), 585-606.       
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Chapter 2:  The Impact of Debt Relief on Child Mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa  2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the effects of debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative on under-five mortality rate (U5MR). High under five mortality rate (U5MR) is 
still a problem in many SSA countries. According to Umar and Osinusi (2014), the U5MR in SSA 
is about seven times higher than the European rate. The United Nations' International Children's 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF)  and  the World Health Organization(WHO) showed that the U5MR 
in Niger was as high as 320 per thousand in the 1990s.  Figure 1 indicates the high level of U5MR 
in SSA relative to the world and industrialized country averages. It is a development concern as it 
undermines human capital accumulation which is critical for economic growth as highlighted in 
Bloom and Canning (2003) and Bleakley (2007). The major causes of high U5MR are preventable 
diseases such as pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria, measles, HIV/AIDS, among others as listed in 
Wagstaff et al. (2004) and Caulfeld et al. (2004). Prevention requires a number of interventions, 
which in turn depends on healthcare financing. 
Unfortunately, most households in SSA are too poor to afford healthcare services and most 
SSA governments are constrained by limited resources amidst weak institutions to deliver 
healthcare services.  The average annual SSA government expenditure on healthcare is about $25 
per person (Boyce and Ndikumana, 2011) which is inadequate to provide quality healthcare ser-
vices necessary to tackle the causes of child mortality.  In addition, many SSA countries contracted 
huge external debt in the 1970s and 1980s due to high oil prices. The United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports that between 1970 and 1979, SSA's external debt 
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to export ratio was 66%. However, the ratio jumped to 159% between 1980 and 1989 and peaked 
at 243% in the 1990-1996 period (UNCTAD, 2004). High external debt service crowds out public 
good provision (Naiman and Watkins, 1999). This can lead to poor healthcare service and associ-
ated adverse health outcomes such as high U5MR. Due to the poor development indicators of SSA 
and other low income regions, philanthropists and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) like 
OXFAM and the Jubilee Debt Coalition lobbied for debt forgiveness for highly indebted low in-
come countries. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to forgive 
external debt of poor countries through the HIPC Initiative. Since the implementation of the HIPC 
Initiative, external debt service obligation of SSA countries decreased in the eligible countries.  
Although U5MR is still high in SSA, the WHO (2013) reported an average 4.2 percent 
annual reduction between 2000 and 2013. Lozano et al. (2011) also found out that under-five death 
rates have been on a downward trend in 106 countries between 2000 and 2011. The period 2000-
2011 coincided with the implementation of the HIPC Initiative. Could the decrease in U5MR in 
SSA be partially explained by participation in the debt relief initiative? 
To answer this research question, I use datasets from the WHO, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. A robust dynamic panel data estimator is used in the regressions. 
I test the hypothesis that participation in the HIPC Initiative reduces U5MR through reforms and 
through the increase in public healthcare expenditures. The results show that SSA countries which 
participated in HIPC initiative achieved an average 4.7 reduction in child deaths per thousand live 
births.  However, the effect of the amount of debt relief per capita is statistically insignificant. 
This chapter is of health and development significance to SSA. It contributes to the litera-
ture on the relationship between debt forgiveness and health outcomes. Previous research in this 
area focused on the impact of debt forgiveness on health expenditures/health budget. However, 
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citizens and policy makers are more interested in improvements in health outcomes than in health 
expenditures per se.  To my knowledge, this the first study to analyze the effect of the HIPC Initi-
ative on a specific health outcome in African countries. The chapter is organized as follows:  I 
provide background and a description of the debt relief program in section 2.2. This is followed 
by a review of related literature in section 2.3. Thereafter, the econometric strategy and data de-
scription are presented in sections 2.4 and 2.5, respectively. This is followed by a discussion of the 
results in section 2.6. A conclusion of the chapter is presented in section 2.7. 
 
2.2 Background: The Debt Relief Initiatives 
The oil price shocks of the 1970s and 1980s led to high indebtedness of many developing 
countries. The countries borrowed heavily from the Paris Club group of countries1, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to finance oil imports. Data from the United Nations' 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) show that servicing of external debt was tak-
ing over 150% of export value during the 1970-2002 period. This potentially crowded out public 
goods provision. The indebtedness and poverty in developing countries attracted the attention of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who lobbied for cancellation of the debts on the premise 
that funds meant for external debt repayment would be used for poverty alleviation programs. The 
IMF and the World Bank designed and implemented the HIPC Initiative starting in 1996. Under 
the HIPC Initiative, the amount of external debt forgiven is earmarked for the provision of social 
services such as healthcare, water and sanitation, and education.  
                                                     1  Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-dom and the United States of America 
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 Participation in the HIPC Initiative is a two-step process.  Eligible countries initiate the 
process by committing to economic reforms and preparing Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs). According to the World Bank and the IMF, a country is eligible if, in present value terms, 
the debt to export ratio exceeds 150 percent. At the initiation point, participating countries get 
partial and conditional debt relief. The second stage of the program, known as the completion 
point, is reached when a country achieves macroeconomic stability, structural reforms and suc-
cessful implementation of PRSPs for at least one year. At completion point, the countries get total 
debt relief equivalent to the amount determined at the decision point. 
This suggests two pathways through which the HIPC Initiative could affect health out-
comes. The requirement for HIPCs to make reforms and work towards poverty reduction, includ-
ing improvement in healthcare delivery, is one such possible pathway. For this reason, the HIPC 
Initiative participation is hypothesized to have a significant impact on U5MR. The second possible 
pathway through which the HIPC Initiative could affect U5MR is the amount of debt forgiven. If 
the amount of resources devoted to social service provisions has positive impacts on healthcare 
services, one would expect the amount of debt relief to have an impact on under-five mortality. 
Therefore, I include both an HIPC Initiative dummy variable and the amount of external debt for-
given per capita in the empirical model. The impact of the two variables differs because reforms 
at the HIPC Initiative decision point can change the healthcare system as a whole but the amount 
of debt relief may lead to increased inputs to the healthcare sector through PRSPs. 
Table 1 shows the list of SSA countries that benefited from the HIPC Initiative as well as 
those who did not. In total, 33 SSA countries participated in the HIPC Initiative program. The non-
HIPCs are middle-income countries whose external debts were deemed sustainable or they are 
low-income countries with civil strife and human right violations. There is variation in the decision 
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points and completion points due to eligibility criteria and the pace of reforms. Table 1 also indi-
cates that Benin reached the decision point in 2000 and the completion point in 2003, while Chad 
reached decision point in 2001 and has not reached completion point to date. Uganda reached both 
the decision and completion points within the same year (2000). This indicates a large variation in 
timing of debt relief program participation and benefits.  Again, Table 1 shows that most HIPCs 
had external debt to export ratios (EDXR) of more than 150% whereas the non-HIPCs had mod-
erate rates except Eritrea and Sudan. The mean export values of the HIPCs are also low compared 
to non-HIPCs. This variation is useful in identifying the impact of   participation in the HIPC 
initiative. 
 
2.3 Related Literature 
High under-five mortality rate is a problem in many developing countries due to poor 
healthcare systems and a number of environmental and epidemiological factors.  The availability 
and allocation of more resources towards the healthcare sector can improve child survival. Umar 
and Osinusi (2014) pointed out that the major causes of under-five mortality in SSA are preventa-
ble diseases such as malaria, pneumonia, measles, under nutrition, and HIV, but many households 
in SSA are too poor to mitigate the causes of child mortality. A significant proportion of house-
holds in SSA rely on government provision of healthcare services. However, governments in SSA 
have weak health systems which limits access to quality healthcare services.  
Andersen (1995) shows that access to healthcare services depends on the health system 
(infrastructure, policy, financing and organization), socioeconomic and demographic factors, as 
well as personal health behaviors. Rutherford et al. (2009), through a systematic literature review, 
indicate that governments in SSA need to increase access to healthcare services in order to reduce 
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child mortality.  It is plausible that debt relief could lead to improvement in healthcare financing 
by freeing resources which were used to service external debt (Kaddar and Furrer, 2008, Domeland 
and Kharas, 2009). This study provides new results on the impact of debt relief on under-five 
mortality rate (U5MR) in SSA. The following review of previous studies highlight the factors 
which influence under-five mortality and link them with the HIPC Initiative. A number of studies 
have shown that public health expenditure influences health outcomes including U5MR. For in-
stance, Akinci et al. (2014) applied a pooled least squared method and a Taylor-Hausman panel 
data method and they found that an increase in both private and government spending on healthcare 
led to significant reduction in under-five mortality in the Middle East and North Africa. They noted 
that a one percent increase in government expenditure on health per capita is associated with a 
reduction in infant mortality by 7.2 to 8.6 per thousand live births.  
Focusing on Sub Sharan Africa, Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2009) used a panel of 47 SSA 
countries to examine the impact of government expenditure on health outcomes. Their results show 
that an increase in government health expenditure is associated with a reduction in U5MR. In a 
broader study, Farag et al. (2013) applied fixed effects models on  panel data from 133 countries 
and found that government health expenditure significantly reduces infant and under-five mortality 
rate.  Bokhari et al. (2007) used a generalized methods of moments (GMM) and  showed that the 
elasticity of under-five mortality rate with respect to government expenditures lies between -0.25 
and -0.42.   It is evident from these studies, notwithstanding the disparate methods and datasets, 
that increasing healthcare expenditure is one strategy that can be used to reduce under-five mor-
tality rate. In this study, debt relief is analyzed as one of the ways through which the governments 
of SSA countries changed health sector budgets and potentially impacted healthcare service pro-
vision and U5MR. 
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Studies from other regions have shown that governments play significant roles in reducing 
child mortality. For instance, Nixon and Ullmann (2006) employed a fixed effects model on a 
panel of 15 European Union countries for the period 1980-1995. They found that increased 
healthcare expenditure was associated with a statistically significant reduction in infant mortality. 
Cremieux et al. (2005) showed that Canadian provinces with higher health spending levels on 
medicine had better health outcomes. Their simulated results indicate that if all Canadian provinces 
increased per capita health expenditure above the observed highest expenditure, infant deaths 
would be reduced by 584 per annum.  
Using National Family Health Survey of India and state level data, Farahani et al. (2010) 
found that a 10 percentage increase in government expenditure on healthcare in India would reduce 
the probability of death among the young by about 2 percent.  Other studies which showed that 
increases in public health expenditures lead to improvements in health outcomes include Gupta et 
al. (2000), Martin et al. (2008), and Craigwell et al. (2012).   
As much as debt relief affected government budget positions, it may also be considered as 
a development aid since it is meant to help poor countries use available resources for provision of 
social services as well as instituting reforms.  Considering the usefulness of aid, Burnside and 
Dollar (2000), showed that foreign aid has a significant impact on reducing infant mortality when 
the recipient country has good governance. They show that an increase in aid by 1 percent of GDP 
would reduce infant mortality by 0.9 percent if governance is strong. Mishra and Newhouse (2009) 
used data from 118 countries observed between 1973 and 2004 to investigate the impact of health 
aid on infant mortality. They showed that health aid leads to a statistically significant reduction in 
infant mortality.  
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Other studies which find a positive effect of health aid on health outcomes include Feeny 
and Ouattara (2013), Bendavid and Bhattacharya (2014) and Gyimah-Brempong (2015).  There-
fore the HIPC initiative, which was spearheaded by the IMF, the World Bank and the Jubilee 2000 
campaign, may have similar impact as aid for health, despite not being sector specific. 
 It should be noted that the allocation of more resources towards the health sector may not 
lead to improvements in health outcomes in the absence of proper governance and accountability 
mechanisms.  Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) showed that the effectiveness of government spend-
ing in reducing child mortality depends on the quality of governance. Thus, there is a need for 
good institutional and policy environment for interventions (Haddad and Fournier, 1995, Wagstaff 
et al., 2004). In this respect, Freytag and Pehnelt (2009) and Lala et al. (2006) found a positive 
relationship between grants and institutional quality. They observe that conditionality and assess-
ment of HIPCs by international financial institutions in the process of making decisions on debt 
relief motivated improvement in governance quality. 
 Foster and Leavy (2001) noted that the objective of conditionality of aid is based on the 
assumption that government values the aid to the extent that it can change behaviors so as to meet 
donor preferences. Therefore, the HIPC Initiative conditionality for increased social expenditure 
and poverty reduction have the potential to impact U5MR since progress is monitored before debt 
is cancelled.  
Dessy and Vencatachellum (2007) showed that between 1989 and 2003, the debt relief led 
to a significant increase in the share of resources allocated towards public health and education in 
SSA. Figure 3 indicates that the share of public healthcare expenditure in national budgets in-
creased in HIPCs between 1998 and 2012. In this study, a dummy variable which indicates HIPC 
Initiative status of a SSA country is used to identify the impact of conditionality. 
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I also note that healthcare expenditure is only an input in the production function of health 
(Grossman, 1972) and the increase in expenditure may not necessarily translate into better health 
outcomes.  For this matter, there are studies which find ambiguous impact of health expenditure 
on health outcomes. For instance, Fisher et al. (2003) used US Medicare data and found that pa-
tients in regions with high medical expenditures received more health services than those in lower-
spending regions but there was no statistically significant differences in health outcomes between 
the regions.  
This implies that the impact of health expenditure on health outcome depends on other 
factors. One such factor can be the fungibility of funds within health sector. Van de Walle and Mu 
(2007) observed that fungibility of funds make foreign aid ineffective. Dieleman and Hanlon 
(2014) and Lu et al. (2010) found out that external aid to health is fungible and tend to displace 
government health financing. This implies that beneficiaries of the HIPC initiative may not allo-
cate the canceled debt service towards social services if governments are ineffective and less re-
sponsive to the healthcare needs of the citizens.  Moreover, the HIPC debt relief is not restricted 
to healthcare sector but embraces general macroeconomic management and poverty reduction as 
a whole.  On a positive note, Van de Sijpe (2013) showed that if off-budget health aid are explicitly 
included as a covariate in cross country regressions, the degree of fungibility found in Lu et al. 
(2010) is reduced remarkably.  In addition, Fagernas and Roberts (2004) and Ouattara (2006) 
showed that many developing countries have large off-budget aid and therefore the degree of aid 
fungibility could be overestimated. 
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 There are several studies which find insignificant impacts of government health expendi-
ture on health outcomes. Babazono and Hillman (1994) found no relationship between health ex-
penditures per capita and health outcomes in OECD countries. They argue that the way resources 
are allocated and utilized within the health sector is more important than the actual amount spent. 
This, in essence, is related to the probable impact of HIPC Initiative participation which required 
institutional reforms and implementation of PRSPs. Thus it might be plausible to find an insignif-
icant effect of the amount of debt relief but a strong impact of program participation.  
Zakir and Wunnava (1999) used a cross sectional dataset of 117 countries for the year 1993 
and found that government expenditure on healthcare, as a proportion of GNP, does not signifi-
cantly influence infant mortality rates.  It is probable that the HIPC Initiative, which focuses on 
macroeconomic reforms and institutional strengthening, could influence under-five mortality 
through better healthcare management than through the increase of resources.  
To conclude the survey of the related literature, I note that there are mixed conclusions 
about the impact of healthcare expenditure on health outcomes. Increased public healthcare spend-
ing provides necessary inputs in the production of healthcare services. Therefore the HIPC Initia-
tive could have led to improvement in healthcare services in the participating countries through 
availability of additional resources. Furthermore, the reforms which eligible countries were ex-
pected to make through PRSPs could also impact healthcare systems and institutions. This could 
have made healthcare sectors more effective in the provision of services and hence impact out-
comes including U5MR. However, the relationship between increased resources and U5MR is not 
direct and could depend on other factors which need to be controlled for in the empirical analysis. 
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It is also noted that no other study examined the direct impact of the HIPC debt relief 
initiative on under-five mortality in SSA. The most recent and closest research to this work is 
Dessy and Vencatachellum (2007) which considers debt relief and social spending. I extend the 
analysis by examining the direct impact of HIPC participation and the amount of debt forgiven on 
under-five mortality rate. This can be of interest to policy makers and citizens who are often inter-
ested in health outcomes rather than in inputs in the production of healthcare. 
 
2.4 Econometric Strategy 
To identify the impact of debt relief on under-five mortality rate, I exploit the variation in 
the timing of HIPC Initiative status across the SSA countries. As shown in Table 1, each country 
has a unique date at which it qualified for debt relief. For instance, Uganda is the first country to 
receive debt relief in the year 2000. Tanzania and Mozambique qualified in 2001. Mauritania and 
Burkina Faso benefited in 2002. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros, Republic of 
Congo, Liberia and Togo benefited as late as 2010. Chad, though designated as a HIPC has not 
completed the necessary reforms to receive full debt cancellation. The variations in the dates of 
debt relief helps in the identification of the HIPC Initiative impact over time. Secondly, the non-
uniform participation of SSA countries in the HIPC Initiative is akin to a natural experiment. The 
HIPCs could be taken as a pseudo experimental group while the non-HIPCs serve as a control 
group. Figure 4 is a comparative map which indicates HIPC Initiative status of a country and the 
percentage reduction in U5MR between 1996 and 2012.  The spatial distribution of U5MR reduc-
tion and HIPC Initiative status seems to overlap. 
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 In the empirical analysis, a dummy variable with value equal to one for years a country 
had its external debt forgiven represents program participation in the pseudo-experimental group. 
The control group (non-HIPCs) is coded zero. Furthermore, the external debt forgiven, measured 
in real per capita values, is used to indicate the level of benefit from the program. There is signif-
icant variation in the amount of debt relief as shown in Table 1. 
I apply a dynamic panel data method in the estimation and the approach is similar to that 
used by recent studies on health aid such as Mishra and Newhouse (2009) and Bendavid, 
Bhattacharya (2014), and Gyimah-Brempong (2015). I assume that there is a linear relationship 
between U5MR (ݕ), participation in debt relief (ܦܧܤܶ), real external debt forgiven per capita 
under HIPC (ܣܦܧܤܶ), lagged under-five mortality rate (ݕ௜௧ିଵ), and a vector of controls (X) which 
potentially influences U5MR.  Symbolically the dynamic linear relationship is specified as: 
ݕ௜௧ = ߙ + ߩݕ௜௧ିଵ + ߤଵܣܦܧܤ ௜ܶ௧ + ߤଶܦܧܤ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚܺ௜௧ + ܿ௜ + ߣ௧ + ߝ௜௧  ,                                        (2.1) 
where ܺ ௜௧ includes government expenditure on healthcare as a percentage of Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP), real Gross National Income (ܩܰܫ) per capita, fertility rate, urbanization, and govern-
ment effectiveness measured on a scale from zero to one hundred . In the model, ܿ௜ denotes country 
fixed effects. The year fixed effects,  ߣ௧ , capture general improvement in health technology over 
time while ߝ௜௧ is the stochastic error term. I posit that changes in ܣܦܧܤܶ and ܦܧܤܶ are associated 
with changes in under-five mortality rate. 
To eliminate country-specific effects which would be correlated with the explanatory var-
iables, I take the first differences of equation (2.1) to obtain equation (2.2). 
Δݕ௜௧ = ߩΔݕ௜௧ିଵ + ߤଵΔܣܦܧܤ ௜ܶ௧ + ߤଶΔܦܧܤ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚΔܺ௜௧ + Δߣ௧ + Δߝ௜௧                                  (2.2) 
The impact of the amount of debt relief per capita is represented by   ߤଵ, while the impact of HIPC 
Initiative participation as opposed to non-HIPC is represented by  ߤଶ.  
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Assuming strict exogeneity, equation (3) could be estimated by a pooled least squares re-
gression. The same result could be obtained using a fixed effects (FE) estimator, which involves 
applying ordinary least squares regression to time demeaned variables, however, contemporaneous 
correlation between explanatory variables and the stochastic term introduces endogeneity and in-
consistency in estimates. The problem of endogeneity, biases, and inconsistencies in dynamic 
panel data has been dealt with in Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) using 
instrumental variables (IVs). Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed the first difference DPD estima-
tor which uses lagged differenced variables as instruments in GMM estimation.  
Blundell and Bond (1998) and Roodman (2009) notes that the first difference DPD intro-
duces more data gaps in unbalanced panel data during the process of differencing. Lagged differ-
ences are also weak instruments in highly persistent series in levels. To avoid weak instrument and 
finite sample problems, the efficient two step system GMM introduced by Blundell and Bond 
(1998) is applied. The system DPD estimator combines the difference and level equations and 
estimate them jointly as a system to increase efficiency. Lagged levels are used as instruments in 
the differenced equation while lagged differences are used as instruments in the level equation. 
The advantage of system GMM is that it preserves time-invariant regressors which would have 
been wiped out in the first difference GMM (Roodman, 2009). This is critical for this study since 
ܦܧܤܶ is a dummy variable of major interest. I also note that the systems estimator may suffer 
from proliferation of instruments which could lead to inconsistent estimates. To reduce the number 
of instruments, I restrict lagged instruments to the fourth and fifth lags of the endogenous variable. 
I test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions as well as the presence of   auto-correlated 
errors.  
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2.5 Data Description 
The dataset represents panel data from 43 SSA countries covering the 1998-2012 period. 
Of the 43 countries, 30 are HIPCs whereas 13 are non-HIPCs. The list of countries and the dates 
of HIPC qualification and completion are contained in Table 1. In the analysis, the dependent 
variable is the under-five mortality rate (U5MR) which measures the number of deaths per thou-
sand children under-five years of age in each country on an annual basis. Data on U5MR are ob-
tained from the Global Health Observatory of the World Health Organization (WHO). The explan-
atory variables of major interest are the program participation in the HIPC Initiative (ܦܧܤܶ) and 
the real debt relief per capita received (ܣܦܧܤܶ). ܦܧܤܶ is measured as a dummy variable that is 
equal to one for the years in which a country received debt relief but zero for years when there was 
no debt relief. 
 Data on the status of a country as HIPC or non-HIPC as well as the amount of debt relief 
were extracted from IMF's Annual Statistical Updates on the HIPC Initiative.  ܣܦܧܤܶ is computed 
as the real total external debt relief under the HIPC initiative divided by the total population of a 
given country in a year. The control variables are real national income per capita, government 
expenditure on health, female education, urbanization, fertility rate, government health expendi-
ture, and government effectiveness. The inclusion of the controls is guided by existing literature 
on health outcomes (Musgrove, 1996, Filmer and Pritchett, 1999, and Rutherford et al. 2009). I 
measure income as real Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. ܩܰܫ is more closely related to 
disposable income available to citizens and can potentially impact health outcomes through remit-
tances; a common phenomenon in SSA countries. 
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 Government health expenditure (ܩܪܧܣܮܶܪ) is measured as the government health ex-
penditure to GDP ratio. Fertility rate is measured as the average number of births per adult female 
(ܤܴ). Female education is measured by the female enrollment ratio (ܧܴܱܰܮ), while urbanization 
(ܷܴܤܣܰ) is the ratio of population that lives in urban areas. Data for the control variables were 
obtained from different sources including the World Bank (2013)2.  
 Burnside and Dollar (2004) argue that aid (and its components) is effective only in coun-
tries with better governance or policy environments.  For this reason, a measure of government 
effectiveness is included in the model and data are obtained from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, 2015 update. Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality 
of public services and the degree of its independence from political pressures, quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such pol-
icies as defined in Kaufmann et al. (2011). It is measured in percentile rank relative to other coun-
tries' rank which ranges from zero (lowest rank) to one hundred (highest rank). I posit that effective 
governance would lead to better healthcare service delivery in government owned clinics/hospitals 
and impact under-five mortality rate.  
 Descriptive statistics of the variables with sub-sample means and differences in means of 
key variables are provided in Table 2. The summary statistics indicate a modest increase in gov-
ernment healthcare expenditure as a proportion of GDP during the sample period. The summary 
statistics also show that HIPCs spent relatively more on healthcare than non-HIPCs. The small but 
statistically significant difference indicates that the conditionality of the HIPC Initiative to allocate 
more funds towards social services could have encouraged budget allocation for the healthcare 
sectors. HIPCs also have higher U5MR than non-HIPCs and the difference in means is statistically 
                                                     
2 downloaded from data.worldbank.org   Accessed on 04/04/2015 
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significant. There is also a statistically significant difference in Gross National Income (ܩܰܫ) per 
capita, net female school enrollment (ܧܴܱܰܮ), and urbanization (ܷܴܤܣܰ). To avoid spurious 
results, the Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) panel unit tests were performed and the test 
statistics show that the dependent variable (U5MR) is stationary and hence meets the assumptions 
of the system GMM estimator. 
 
2.6  Results 
In estimating the models, I applied the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction to the 
two-step system GMM. This is to account for the small sample size. Therefore, all diagnostic and 
statistical tests are based on small sample statistics. The estimates are contained in Table 3. Column 
(1) presents the baseline results without the debt relief variables. Column (2) presents the estimate 
that uses ܣܦܧܤܶ as the measure of debt relief, while Column (3) contain estimates for the equation 
that include only the ܦܧܤܶ dummy variable. The Arellano and Bond (1991) test for second order 
autocorrelation shows that there is no second order auto-regression (AR) in the differenced resid-
uals. The Hansen-J statistic shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the 
over-identifying restrictions I impose on the estimations. The Hansen-C statistic indicates that the 
instruments are exogenous for all the equations. For the overall goodness of fit of the model, the 
F-statistic shows that the model fits the data well. 
The baseline results in Column (1) indicate the effect of the control variables on U5MR. 
The coefficients have the expected signs as found in previous research (Filmer and Pritchett, 1999 
and  Rutherford et al, 2009). Column (2) shows the impact of debt relief per capita (ܣܦܧܤܶ) while 
excluding the  ܦܧܤܶ dummy variable. The coefficient for debt relief per capita is not statistically 
significant. This could be due to fungibility of debt relief funds which were not restricted to the 
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health sector. Moreover, the relationship between expenditures and outcomes tends to be vague 
(Clemens et al, 2007).  Thus, an increase in health expenditure is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for better health outcomes. This is similar to the results of previous research that find no 
statistically significant effect of health aid on health outcomes. 
The signs of the coefficients of the control variables are as expected and are significantly 
different from zero at the conventional levels of significance. In particular, the coefficient of gov-
ernment effectiveness is negative and significant while that of the lagged U5MR is positive and 
significantly different from zero at the one percent level. The coefficient of lagged U5MR is less 
than unity; indicating a stable relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables in this equation. 
Column (3) presents the estimates that uses the ܦܧܤܶ dummy variable as the measure of 
debt relief in the model. The coefficient of the ܦܧܤܶ dummy variable is -4.72 and it is statistically 
significant at the one percent level. This indicates that, on average, countries which benefited from 
debt relief had a 4.72 reduction in under-five mortality rate relative to non-HIPCs. The magnitude 
of the impact seems modest, but as Easterly (2009) argues, the success or failures of SSA countries 
should be judged on the progress made rather than on the predetermined levels stated in the MDGs.  
As in Column (2), the estimates of the control variables have the expected signs and are 
significantly different from zero. Considering government effectiveness as one of the controls 
which mediates the effectiveness of the HIPC Initiative, the coefficient is statistically significant 
at 5 percent level. The coefficients show that a 10 unit increase in government effectiveness rank 
is associated with a1.48 reduction in under-five mortality rate. This suggests that good governance 
complements debt relief in addressing child mortality. This is a plausible result since good gov-
ernance ensures improvements in the healthcare system.  
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This result supplements Dessy and Vencatachellum (2007) who find that the interaction 
between debt relief and changes in political institutions have a statistically significant impact on 
the share of healthcare expenditure. The coefficient of the lagged U5MR is positive and less than 
unity, indicating a stable relationship between U5MR and the explanatory variables. 
Overall, the results indicate that participation in the HIPC Initiative significantly reduces 
under-five mortality in SSA countries. It is probable that the estimates depend on model specifi-
cation. To test for this possibility, I conduct some robustness tests. I maintain the dynamic panel 
data framework but include the lags of ܣܦܧܤܶ and ܦܧܤܶ dummy variable. This is meant to test 
the idea that the impact of interventions occurs contemporaneously as well as with a lag. The 
results are contained in Table 4. 
  Column (1) of Table 4 presents the estimates of the equation that measures HIPC Initiative 
as the amount of per capita debt relief while column (2) presents the estimates of the equation that 
indicates participation in the program using a dummy variable(ܦܧܤܶ). The diagnostic statistics 
suggest that this specification fits the data well. The overall finding is not affected. The impact of 
the amount of debt relief per capita remains statistically insignificant.  
The coefficient of the ܦܧܤܶ dummy variable is negative and statistically significant at one 
percent level but the magnitude decreased to 3.99. The coefficients of lagged ܣܦܧܤܶ and lagged 
ܦܧܤܶ  are insignificant, suggesting that both ܣܦܧܤܶ and ܦܧܤܶ have contemporaneous effects 
on ܷ5ܯܴ but not lagged effects. 
It is possible that debt relief has a statistically significant impact on ܷ5ܯܴ only in countries 
with good governance or policy environments. To test for this possibility, I included an interaction 
between the governance index and ܦܧܤܶ as an added control variable in the ܷ5ܯܴ equation. The 
estimates are presented in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4. The diagnostic statistics indicate a good 
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fit to the data but the coefficient of lagged U5MR is unity. The coefficient of ܣܦܧܤܶ is negative 
but insignificant while that of the ܦܧܤܶ dummy is negative and significant at the one percent 
level. The estimate of the interaction term (governance and ܦܧܤܶ) in both equations is insignifi-
cant. The coefficient of lagged ܷ5ܯܴ is positive, relatively large in Column (3) and significantly 
different from zero. However, it is not significantly different from unity, suggesting that the rela-
tionship is not stable over time and the specification can be discarded.   
Further robustness checks to test the effect of health aid are presented in Table 5. I include 
the amount of aid for health as a control and the results show that the impact of participation in 
HIPC Initiative remains statistically significant. The insignificant impact of health aid could be 
attributed to the correlation between aid and debt relief (ρ = -0.1128 and significant at α=0.01).  
I conclude from this exercise that the results do not depend on model specification. The 
finding that the participation in the HIPC Initiative, rather than the amount of debt forgiveness ,is 
one of the drivers of the decrease in U5MR shows that PRSPs and reforms required by the HIPC 
Initiative contributed to the observed decrease in U5MR in SSA. This interpretation of the results 
is consistent with the conditional effectiveness of aid hypothesis (Burnside and Dollar, 2004).  
 
2.7  Conclusion 
This study used panel data covering the 1998-2012 period to investigate the impact of debt 
forgiveness under the HIPC Initiative on under-five mortality rates in SSA countries. I find that 
the decision of a country to accept and participate in the HIPC Initiative has a statistically signifi-
cant effect in reducing under-five mortality rate. Allowing for lagged effects, the impact of HIPC 
Initiative participation remains statistically significant, though the magnitude decreases to about 4 
per thousand. The estimates are also robust to changes in model specification. The impact of the 
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amount of debt relief per capita is statistically insignificant. This suggests that the amount of debt 
cancelled may not be important but the PRSPs and reforms in social service provision are the 
transmission mechanisms. These findings provide new insights about aid, debt relief and interna-
tional cooperation as strategies that can be used to improve child survival in SSA.  
The result suggests that monitored reforms in the provision of social services can lead to 
the achievement of desired outcomes. Thus, the conditions and reforms prior to qualification for 
debt cancellation seem more important than the actual amount of debt forgiven. Although the over-
all reduction in U5MR has not reached the MDG of reducing under-five mortality to two thirds of 
the 1990 level, the HIPC Initiative has contributed to the reduction in under-five mortality rate.  
The maps in Figure 4 show that countries which benefited at the onset of the program 
(Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Niger) experienced the largest reduction in U5MR 
between 1996 and 2012.  This pictorial illustration and the empirical estimates indicate that the 
HIPC Initiative impacted U5MR in SSA. These results should, however, be interpreted with cau-
tion. In the empirical analysis, I proxy the impact of the HIPC Initiative by a dummy variable 
indicating participation and the per capita debt forgiven under the program. It is not possible to 
measure the degree of improvement in healthcare services during the HIPC Initiative decision 
points nor was I able to determine how much of the debt forgiven was devoted to healthcare or the 
effective utilization of these resources. This could affect the results. 
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Table 1:   HIPC Status and Mean External Debt Export ratio (EDXR) 
Country Decision point Completion point DEBT EDXR* Exports* Benin 2000 2003 719 171.09 859 Burkina Faso 2000 2002 881.4 319.6 859 Burundi 2005 2009 284.5 1487 103 Cameroon 2000 2006 870 212.52 4,547 Central African Republic 2007 2009 312.2 360.1 206 Chad 2001  411.7 169.1 2,347 Comoros 2010 2010 47.5 390.76 55.92 Cote d'Ivoire 2009 2012 1678 178.50 6,927 Congo Republic 2006 2010 175.6 192.22 5,279 Dem. Rep. of Congo 2003 2010 1390.1 193.15 4,215 Ethiopia 2001 2004 2585 371.22 2,291 Gambia 2000 2007 196.8 256.49 208 Ghana 2002 2004 3229.4 168.89 6,287 Guinea 2000 2012 792.5 307.84 1,081 Guinea-Bissau 2000 2010 147.4 1081.69 103 Liberia 2008 2010 501.2 591.8 222 Madagascar 2000 2004 1778.7 276.09 1,601 Malawi 2000 2006 1487.3 329.064 852 Mali 2000 2003 1348.1 233.109 1,643 Mauritania 2000 2002 572 171.92 1,142 Mozambique 2000 2001 1738.8 398.041 2,099 Niger 2000 2004 821.2 326.916 728 Rwanda 2000 2005 540.6 546.71 374 Sao Tome and Principe 2000 2007 44.2 1492.61 18 Senegal 2000 2004 1797.8 174.43 2,367 Sierra Leone 2002 2006 416.7 952.35 247 Tanzania 2000 2001 3107.6 285.48 3,647 Togo 2008 2010 615.3 226.62 828 Uganda 2000 2000 2977.7 289.88 1,887 Zambia 2000 2005 1966.6 313.28 3,659 Angola NON-HIPC   85.4 30340 Botswana NON-HIPC   18.5 4420 Djibouti NON-HIPC   163.7 262 Eritrea NON-HIPC   261.8 98 Kenya NON-HIPC   138.8 5780 Lesotho NON-HIPC   62.9 672 Mauritius NON-HIPC   30.0 3953 Namibia NON-HIPC   30 3207 Nigeria NON-HIPC   85.4 53300 Seychelles NON-HIPC   878.8 303 South Africa NON-HIPC   77.3 68270 Sudan NON-HIPC   690.2 5712 Swaziland NON-HIPC   22.8 1771 Zimbabwe NON-HIPC   144.3 2560  Source: IMF HIPC Statistical update 2014 *Mean values over the period 1998-2012. Exports and DEBT are in millions of US dollars.
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Table 2:   Means and Differences in Means 
 HIPC NON-HIPC  Variable Mean Mean Differences in Mean 
U5MR 130.734 108.0556 22.678***  (44.320) (46.518) (4.030) 
Real GNI per capita 1377.375 3262.1 -1884.724***  (1847.563) (4438.985 ) (241.894) 
Govt Health expenditure-GDP ratio 11.087 9.664 1.423***  (3.470) (3.755) (0.322) 
Urbanization rate 36.825 40.372 -3.547**  (11.155) (16.421) (1.132) 
School Enrollment 62.620 69.569 -6.948**  (19.611) (20.60913) (2.188) Government Effectiveness 29.104 27.25 1.84  (17.506) (21.176) (1.654)     Observations 160 545 703 Notes ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0:05,   *p < 0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses. HIPC indicates the group of countries which benefited from the debt relief initiative and has implemented the required conditionality, while NON-HIPC is the pseudo control group. Govt indicates Government.  The Levin Lin and Chu (2002), and Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) unit-root test were performed to check for unit roots and they show that U5MR is stationary.  
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Table 3:   Two Step System GMM Results 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) Lagged U5MR 0.982*** 0.969*** 0.893***  (0.0636) (0.0589) (0.0505) ADEBT  -0.0123    (0.0126)  DEBT   -4.715***    (0.969) GOV -0.151** -0.172*** -0.148***  (0.0652) (0.0602) (0.0517) Other Controls YES YES YES Year Dummies YES YES YES Observations 310 310 310 Number of Countries 40 40 40 A-B Test for (AR 2)  [p value] [0.367] [0.524] [0.524] Hansen-J statistic 30.49 29.00 25.77 
p-values  [0.441] [0.465] [0.638] Hansen-C statistic 14.68 9.43 15.41 
p-values [0.197] [0.583] [0.165] F-Statistics: F(11,40) 5095.54 *** 3199.76 *** 3447.73*** Notes: *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,   *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the under-five mortality rate. DEBT is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a country is a beneficiary of the debt relief initiative and has implemented the required conditionality. ADEBT is the amount of debt relief per year divided by total population. GOV is a measure of government effectiveness. Control varia-bles include birth rate, GNI per capita, urbanization rate, female school enrollment, and government spend-ing on health. Hansen's test of over identifying restrictions; H0: over identifying restrictions are valid. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in all regressions. A-B is the Arellano and Bond test for zero autocorre-lation (AR) in first-differenced errors. The null hypothesis of no AR (2) cannot be rejected in all regressions.   
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Table 4:   Robustness Check 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  Lagged U5MR 0.994*** 0.895*** 1.002*** 0.961***   (0.100) (0.049) (0.062) (0.093)  ADEBT -0.008   -0.001   (0.01)   (0.008)  
Lagged ADEBT -0.003      (0.010)     DEBT  -3.995*** -6.841***     (1.02) (2.50)   
Lagged DEBT  -0.80      (1.03)    GOV -0.129* -0.137**    
DEBT×GOV 
(0.069) (0.052)    
  0.063 -0.0001     (0.053) (0.055)  Other controls YES YES YES YES  Year Dummies YES YES YES YES        Observations 305 305 305 312  Number of Countries 40 40 40 42  A-B Test for (AR 2) [p-values] [0.278] [0.473] [0.270] [0.161]  Hansen-J-statistic 30.40 24.48 29.77 28.26  
p-values [0.345] [0.656] [0.425] [0.504]  Hansen-C statistic 16.77 8.86 12.88 11.00  
p-values [0.115] [0.635] [0.301] [0.443]  F-Statistics: 2991.24*** 4135.66*** 8064.25*** 7748.67***    Notes *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,   * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the under-five mortality rate. DEBT is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a country is a beneficiary of the debt relief initiative and has implemented the required conditionality. ADEBT is the amount of debt relief per year divided by total population.  GOV is a measure of government effectiveness. Other control variables include birth rate, GNI per capita, urbanization rate, female school enrollment, and government spending on health. Hansen's test of over identifying restrictions; H0: over-identifying restrictions are valid. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in all regressions. The A-B is the Arellano and Bond test for zero autocorrelation (AR) in first differenced errors. The null hypothesis of no AR (2) cannot be rejected in all regressions.
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Table 5:   Robustness Check with Aid for Health 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Lagged U5MR 0.864*** 0.866*** 0.863** 0.891*** 0.903***  (0.052) (0.060) (0.072) (0.076) (0.063) GOV -0.125 -0.053 -0.140 -0.196 -0.206*  (0.123) (0.139) (0.109) (0.168) (0.118) Health aid 0.016 -0.027 -0.028 0.050 0.058  (0.077) (0.083) (0.091) (0.087) (0.051) DEBT -5.050** -5.314**     (2.221) (2.541)    ADEBT 0.009   -0.009   (0.021)   (0.037)  
Lagged DEBT -0.962 -1.179 -3.113    (2.528) (2.494) (2.689)   
Lagged ADEBT -0.004   0.002 -0.004  (0.008)   (0.011) (0.012) Other controls YES YES YES YES YES Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES  Observations (N) 305 310 310 305 305 Number of Country 40 40 40 40 40 A-B Test [p-value] [0.721] [0.521] [ 0.744] [ 0.794] [ 0.525] Hansen-J statistic 11.93 12.74 17.20 17.16 11.45 
p-values [ 0.534] [ 0.622] [0.373] [ 0.309] [0.407] Hansen-C statistic 4.93 5.78 12.51 5.08 2.98 
p-values [ 0.841] [0.761] [0.186] [ 0.827] [0.965] F-Statistics: 4927.67*** 3229.91 *** 3624.49*** 4140.73*** 7059.97***   Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the under-five mortality rate. DEBT is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a country is a beneficiary of the debt relief initiative and has implemented the required conditionality. ADEBT is the amount of debt relief per year divided by total population.  GOV is a measure of government effectiveness. Other control variables include birth rate, GNI per capita, urbanization rate, female school enrollment, and government spending on health. Hansen's test of over identifying restrictions; H0: over-identifying restrictions are valid. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in all regressions. The A-B is the Arellano and Bond test for zero autocorrelation (AR) in first differenced errors. The null hypothesis of no AR (2) cannot be rejected in all regression.        
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 Figure 1:   Comparative Trend of Under-five Mortality  
Data source: World Health Organization; Global Health Observatory.       
 -
 40.0
 80.0
 120.0
 160.0
 200.0
 240.0
197
0
197
2
197
4
197
6
197
8
198
0
198
2
198
4
198
6
198
8
199
0
199
2
199
4
199
6
199
8
200
0
200
2
200
4
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
U5M
R
Sub Saharan Africa World Developed Regions
39  
 Figure 2:   Trend of Under-five Mortality Rate in HIPCs and Non-HIPCs 
Source: Author’s computation   
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 Figure 3: Health Sector Budget Allocation in SSA (1998-2012) 
 Source: Author’s computations.
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 Figure 4:   HIPC status and percentage reduction in U5MR 
Source: Author’s computation. 
 Percentage  Reduction in U5MR59.8 - 74.453.4 - 59.847.4 - 53.441.1 - 47.436.8 - 41.134.3 - 36.826.4 - 34.320.9 - 26.4-10.4 - 20.9No data
 Reduction in U5MR 1996-2012
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Chapter 3: Physician-Induced Demand for Cesarean Sections  3.1 Introduction 
The increase in the rate of cesarean section (CS) births is a public health concern worldwide 
(Betran et al. 2007, Stanton and Holtz, 2006, Gibbons et al., 2012, and WHO, 2015). Niino (2011) 
and Villar et al. (2006) show that globally, most CS births are associated with little medical benefit 
but elevated health risks. According to Minkoff and Chervenak (2003), mothers who have had a 
CS delivery have a high risk of reproductive health problems. 
 Furthermore, babies born via CS tend to have elevated risks of respiratory problems and 
difficulties initiating breastfeeding than those delivered naturally.  CS also impose a financial bur-
den on households and the healthcare system since it is a complicated and expensive procedure 
(Niino, 2011). In Uganda, there are public outcries about the rising number of CS births3. This 
chapter examines the impact of private healthcare facilities (PHC) on the probability of CS births 
in Uganda.  
The study is of relevance from both public health and economic perspectives since avoid-
able CS births impose financial burdens on households and can increase maternal mortality rates.  
Recent studies such as Kinfu et al. (2009), Kiguli et al. (2009), and Ssengooba et al. (2007) under-
score the scarcity of medical supplies and healthcare workers in Uganda and the need for optimal 
                                                     3 Okot (2008) and the Independent (2010) are newspaper articles which report high cesarean birth rates of 15-25 percent in private hospitals in Uganda. The reports indicate that for every CS procedure, the doctor who performs it gets a share of the amount of the fee charged. The public suspects that the monetary gain encourages doctors to rec-ommend expectant mothers for cesarean section births. There are reports of doctors extorting payments from expectant mothers as reported in http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Police-hold-two-doctors-over-extortion/-/688334/3020142/-/ghwan3/-/index.html . This study provides empirical evidence from a nationally representative Demographic and Health Survey dataset. 
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use of the available resources.  It is probable that CS births could adversely affect healthcare re-
source allocation, therefore this study is of policy relevance on maternal healthcare reforms in 
Uganda in relation with MDG number 5. It is noted that decisions about CS births are made under 
principal-agent relationships, a type of contractual arrangement under which the principal engages 
another entity (agent) to perform a service on their behalf. In this study, the expectant mother is 
the principal while the physician/private healthcare facility (PHC) is the agent, who is expected to 
act in the interest of the expectant mother, although this is often not the case. According to Wendler 
(2010), even if physicians are guided by codes of ethics, they sometimes put their personal interests 
above the patients' needs. This phenomenon could arise due to limited time to serve all patients 
and/or the personal motives of the physician where there is limited regulation.  
 Goodrick and Salancik (1996) note that hospital characteristics are influential in determin-
ing the use of CS and uncertainties during birth provides the greatest degree of discretion. In 
Uganda, the PHCs are owned and operated by physicians; a situation which could encourage the 
pursuit of revenue maximization. Compensation for employee physicians in PHCs also depend on 
the kind of services they offer. All these factors may align the profit motive of the PHCs with the 
income maximization objective of physicians, creating a potent environment for physician in-
duced-demand for CS. Data from the Uganda Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) indicate a 
rising trend in CS births, from 2.6 percent in 1995 to 5.4 percent in 2011, however, anecdotal 
evidence such as that presented by Okot (2008) indicates that the CS birth rate is higher in private 
hospitals and clinics.  The increase in the CS birth rate coincided with the rise in the number of 
private healthcare facilities in Uganda following economic liberalization under Structural Adjust-
ment Program (SAPs). 
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Doherty (2011) notes that SAPs led to proliferation of private-for-profit hospitals and clin-
ics in many African countries. The increase in PHCs is a shock which could have influenced the 
behavior of physicians and consequently health outcomes. This study examines the relationship 
between the type of healthcare facility and the likelihood of CS births. The contribution of the 
study to the literature is both theoretical and empirical.  
Whereas the existing literature on CS births such as Cromwell and Mitchell (1986), Gruber 
and Owings (1996), Gruber et al. (1999) and Grant (2009) explain physician induced demand for 
healthcare services in developed market economies, there is no literature on the same phenomenon 
in SSA. To my knowledge, this is the first study to provide an empirical analysis of physician 
induced-demand for CS births using data from an African country. It potentially opens a new di-
rection of research on African healthcare markets given the increase in the number of private hos-
pitals and health insurance schemes.  
The second contribution of the chapter is theoretical. The formulated model of physician 
induced-demand for CS explicitly links the profit objective of PHC with the utility maximization 
objective of expectant mothers. The model shows that information asymmetry increases the like-
lihood of physician induced demand and expectant mothers are more likely to accept CS when the 
severity of health conditions increases. I also show that the price expectant mothers are willing to 
pay for CS implicitly depends on household wealth and disutility of natural births4. 
In the main empirical analysis, I consider births which took place at hospitals only since 
cesarean sections cannot be safely performed outside hospital environments. The dataset for the 
study comes from the 2011 Uganda DHS. The DHS contains information on births which occurred 
                                                     4 Here and thereafter, I broadly distinguish between cesarean section (CS) births and all other births, which I refer to as natural births. 
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within 5 years before the survey. The variables of interest include the type of healthcare facility 
where the birth took place, whether it was by CS or natural birth, complications experienced, the 
type of medical personnel who provided antenatal care, as well as socioeconomic and demographic 
controls. Marital status of the expectant mother and households’ distance to the nearest hospital 
are used as exogenous variables which influence choice of place of delivery but have no influence 
on the method of delivery. Other variables such as education and wealth index are used to control 
for self-selection.  
The capacity of a hospital to perform CS procedures is measured by the number of hospital 
beds as a proxy. This measure is also used as proxy for the quality of service which influences the 
selection of health facility. This could be a controversial indicator of quality but there is limited 
information on other indicators of hospital quality such as personnel and quality of service pro-
vided.  Data on hospital bed capacity is obtained from administrative records.  
The tetrachoric correlation between the dependent variables in the two equations show that 
there is a statistically significant correlation between delivery at PHCs and CS births. It is plausible 
to apply a recursive probit model in the estimation. It involves two seemingly unrelated binary 
equations such that one equation explains the choice of place of delivery which could be PHCs or 
government hospitals and the second equation indicates whether the birth is by CS or natural birth. 
The result shows that the likelihood of CS increases by 6.1 percent for births at PHC relative to 
government hospitals, all things equal. Given the profit motive of private healthcare providers, the 
result is indicative of some degree of supplier-induced demand.  
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Generally, the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 contains a brief background of 
maternal health service provision in Uganda. Section 3.3 presents a review of the literature related 
to physician induced-demand. In section 3.4, I derive the theoretical model and its prediction. Sec-
tions 3.5 and 3.6 describe the data and econometric strategy used in the analysis. Section 3.7 and 
3.8 discuss the empirical estimates of the impact of private health facilities on the probability of 
CS births. The final section (3.9) contains the chapter conclusion. 
 
3.2 Provision of Maternal Health Service in Uganda 
The healthcare system in Uganda is organized according to the level of service offered, 
starting with the most comprehensive to basic primary healthcare services. In the hierarchical 
structure, the National Referral Hospitals are at the top, followed by Regional and District referral 
Hospitals, Health Center IV (sub-district hospital), Health Center III, II and I. The Ministry of 
Health (2010) report indicates that the government owns 2,242 health centers and 59 hospitals. On 
the other hand, 613 health centers and 46 hospitals are owned by not-for-profit private providers. 
Private-for-profit health facilities include 269 health centers and 8 hospitals. In the year 
2000, there were 57 government owned hospitals, 44 not-for-profit hospitals and 3 private hospi-
tals. This indicates that there has been a 166 percent increase in the number of private hospitals 
over the ten year period.  On the other hand, the number of not-for profit private and government 
hospitals increased by a modest 4.5 and 3.5 percent, respectively. The increase in the number of 
private hospitals indicates the possibility that profit motive could be the driving force behind the 
level of provision of some healthcare services, including CS births.  This calls for deeper analysis 
since healthcare is associated with market failures. 
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The not-for-profit private hospitals  are operated by NGOs or faith-based organizations and 
they charge higher fees for services in comparison to free or subsidized government hospitals, 
however, the private-for-profit hospitals charge the highest fee-for-service.  Quality of healthcare 
services varies between rural and urban areas but is similar in government and private hospitals 
(Wane and Martin, 2013).  
Maternal mortality rate (MMR) is still very high in Uganda in comparison to the OECD 
average. The 2011 Uganda DHS estimated 438 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births for the 
seven-year period preceding the survey. The MMR is influenced by a number of factors including 
the healthcare system and healthcare seeking behaviors.  The ability of hospitals to provide cesar-
ean sections can save mothers from risky situations but may also lead to adverse outcomes if it is 
not clinically required. 
Gynecologists in Ugandan government hospitals are paid employees and do not directly 
benefit from fees charged by the hospitals, hence they have little incentive to induce demand for 
avoidable CS. This is in sharp contrast with physicians in private hospitals whose wages depend 
on the services they provide and hospital revenue and hence have incentive to induce demand. 
As pertains to the place of delivery, according to 2011 Uganda DHS data, 57 percent of 
births took place at health facilities, including 44 percent in public-sector health facilities and 13 
percent in private-sector health facilities.  The mode of delivery has also been changing and births 
by cesarean section increased from 2.5 percent in 1995 to 5.4 percent in 2011. The 2011 Uganda 
DHS report shows that 68 percent of mothers who delivered through CS stayed at health facilities 
for three or more days in comparison with natural births. Therefore, CS births exert pressure on 
limited resources in hospitals and on the caregivers and may impose additional burdens on 
healthcare systems. 
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3.3 Literature Review 
The contribution of this study to the literature is both theoretical and empirical. The main 
theoretical contribution is the explicit link of the profit maximization objective of PHCs with the 
utility maximization objective of expectant mothers. The theoretical model shows that the infor-
mation asymmetry between expectant mothers and physicians is the driving force of induced de-
mand when expectant mothers are faced with a choice of mode of delivery (CS or natural birth). 
The derivation shows that physicians can induce the demand for CS if the cost of CS is equivalent 
to the perceived benefit from the expectant mothers' perspective. On the empirical side, this is the 
first study which examines physician induced-demand using data from an African country. The 
results show that the probability of a CS birth increases when the place of delivery is a private 
hospital/clinic. The following are some related previous studies. 
Dranove (1988) showed that medically uninformed patients are more susceptible to physi-
cian induced demand than informed ones. He used a game-theoretic formulation in which physi-
cian induces demand and if the patient accepts, the physician receives a fee for service, otherwise 
an adverse health condition persists without the most effective intervention. The fee depends on 
the cost of the service, the diagnostic ability of the physician and the severity of the patient's con-
dition. I apply a similar approach in modeling the behavior of expectant mothers when faced with 
physicians' suggestion of a cesarean section birth.  
Another related study is Hay and Leahy (1982), which show that physicians provide higher 
quantity of medical services than what is optimal to less informed patients. While the possibility 
of physician induced-demand exists in the healthcare sector, Arrow (1963) and De Jaegher and 
Jegers (2000) noted that physicians are guided by the patient's welfare unlike salesmen for other 
types of goods and services. The degree of physician induced-demand may depend on the type of 
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hospital for which physicians work, subject to professional ethics. According to Epstein and Ni-
cholson (2009), physicians obtain more knowledge on how to practice from fellow physicians and 
from the hospital where they work. This implies that physicians in private practices might create 
demand for some services in order to meet the profit objective of the private hospitals.  
In an empirical study, Tussing and Wojtowycz (1986) used national survey data to examine 
physician induced-demand in Ireland. Their findings indicate that the higher the physicians-to-
population ratio, the higher the frequency of return visits recommended by physicians. This is 
because a high number of physicians in an area depresses physicians' income. Induced-demand is 
then used to increase the volume of services and total income in fee-for-service healthcare systems.  
Fuchs (1978) applied multivariate analysis to US data and found that a 10 percent increase 
in the supply of physicians in an area is associated with a 3 percent increase in surgeries. Similarly, 
Cromwell and Mitchell (1986) used a simultaneous equation model to estimate physician demand 
and fees for surgery. They found a positive relationship between the number of physicians per 
capita and the number of surgeries, especially in large metropolitan areas.   
Birch (1988) and Grytten and Sorensen (2001) showed that the higher the number of den-
tists per capita, the greater the number of recommended dental visits in an area. Nguyen and Der-
rick (1997) examined physicians' response to Medicare fee reductions due to the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989.  They analyzed data from Part B Medicare Annual Data provider files 
for 1989 and 1990 using a fixed-effects model. The results indicate that physicians who were neg-
atively affected by the Act increased the volume of services to compensate for lost revenue.  
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 Delattre and Dormont (2003) used panel data of 4,500 self-employed French physicians 
observed over the period 1979-1993 to study induced-demand for medical services. They observed 
that the physicians experienced a decrease in number of consultations due to an increase in the 
physicians-to-population ratio. Using generalized method of moment estimators, they found that 
physicians counterbalanced the decrease in consultations by increasing the volume of healthcare 
services provided at each consultation. It is therefore probable that an increase in the number of 
privately owned hospitals could lead to an increase in CS births. 
A few empirical works focused on the impact of physician induced demand for CS. A 
notable one is Gruber and Owings (1996). They used state and time variation in fertility rates to 
identify the effect of physicians induced-demand for CS. Their logistic regression results indicate 
that a 10 percent drop in the fertility rate was associated with 0.6 percent increase in the probability 
of CS birth rates. They concluded that the drop in fertility rates resulted in fewer patients for gy-
necologists, hence the need to induce demand for lucrative CS.  
In a follow up study, Gruber et al. (1999) used a logistic model to examine the impact of 
Medicaid fee differentials on the CS birth rate over the period 1988-1992. They found that there 
was lower fee differential for CS and natural delivery under Medicaid in comparison with private 
insurance. The higher difference between fees for CS and natural delivery under private insurance 
schemes explained the difference in CS rates between the two sets of patients (by insurance type). 
This shows that the ability to charge higher fees for CS than regulated rates may motivate physi-
cians to recommend CS births instead of natural birth 
Declercq et al. (2013), in “The Listening to Mothers III Survey and Report” found that 63 
percent of respondents reported that the decision to have a CS was made by a doctor. For mothers 
with a repeat CS, decisions on 22 percent of planned CS were made by physicians. This suggest 
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that in the US, physician have great influence in determining the method of birth and can induce 
demand for CS. In a related study, Brown (1996) used data from US military hospitals to study the 
impact of time and day of the week on CS birth rates. With the aid of a logistic regression model, 
he showed that CS birth is more common during weekends than weekdays. Since physicians in 
military hospitals do not charge fee for service, the increase in CS rates during weekends is ex-
plained by physicians' need for leisure rather than financial gains. He argued that prolonged natural 
delivery create a higher opportunity cost in terms of leisure. Since leisure and working hours are 
substitutes, induced-demand for CS could be higher when physicians' compensation depends on 
the service provided in a PHC.  
Stafford et al. (1993) studied the trend of CS in California between 1983 and 1990. They 
used California discharge abstract data on hospital deliveries and analyzed time trends by indica-
tion, age, race, and payment source. Their results show a statistically significant difference in CS 
rates by payment source. Privately insured expectant mothers were found to have the highest CS 
birth rates relative to Medicare patients. Since insurance claims and fee for service ensures revenue 
flow for physicians in private practice, it potentially influences the degree of induced-demand for 
CS.  
The rate of CS is also impacted by socioeconomic factors such as income and peer influ-
ence. Leone et al. (2008) used a random intercept logistic model and found that in Egypt, Morocco, 
Bangladesh, Colombia and Dominican Republic, women of higher socio-economic background, 
who had better access to antenatal services, are the most likely to undergo cesarean section births. 
They also observed that women who exchange reproductive health information with friends and 
family are less likely to experience CS. This probably indicates that well informed expectant moth-
ers are less susceptible to physician induced-demand. Thus it is important to consider education 
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level and decision making power about health as explanatory variables. Fortunately, these varia-
bles are captured in the Uganda DHS dataset and are used in the empirical analysis.  It is noted 
that physicians in private practice sometimes face risks of claims against malpractice. CS could be 
a form defensive medicine (medical decision making which involves treatment that is not neces-
sarily the best option but serves mainly to protect the physician/hospital against lawsuits by dis-
satisfied patients). In such a scenario, physician induced-demand for CS would be motivated by 
risk aversion rather than by profit.  
 Dubay et al. (1999) used a fixed effects estimator to study the impact of malpractice claims 
risk on CS rates using US national birth certificate data for the 1990 -1992 period. They found that 
defensive medicine by obstetricians led to an increase in CS birth rates. Localio et al. (1993) ex-
ploited New York State hospital data to examine the relationship between the likelihood of mal-
practice claims and CS rates. After controlling for the clinical risk of CS delivery, socioeconomic 
factors, and physician and hospital characteristics, they found that CS rates were positively related 
with physician malpractice premiums.  
Baldwin et al. (1995) and Sloan et al. (1997), however, found no significant impact of risk 
of malpractice claims on the obstetric services including CS rates. Thus, defensive medicine as a 
basis for induced demand for CS have mixed findings. In Uganda, defensive medicine may not be 
as prevalent as in developed market economies because a very small proportion of patients are 
aware of their rights (Kagoya et al. 2013). 
There are a few empirical studies which found no evidence of physician induced-demand 
for CS. Rossiter and Wilensky (1987) examined the extent of physician-initiated expenditures as 
a way of identifying physician induced-demand. After controlling for insurance and other factors, 
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they did not find evidence of physician induced expenditures. They concluded that medical ser-
vices are recommended for the health needs of the patients rather than for the financial benefit of 
the physicians. Tussing and Wojtowycz (1992) used a 1986 dataset of 68,847 obstetric deliveries 
in New York State excluding New York City to study the economic and non-economic factors 
which influence CS birth rates. Using probit regressions, they found no impact regarding the den-
sity of gynecologist and CS delivery in New York State. They showed that county cesarean section 
rates are influenced by the probability that a given delivery required a CS procedure.  
In conclusion, the debate about the existence and the degree of physician induced-demand 
remains unsettled.  Empirical results from previous studies largely depend on the type of data and 
identification strategy used.  The lack of theoretical and empirical study of physician induced -
demand in Sub-Saharan Africa, amidst weak regulation in the health systems raises interest to 
analyze the phenomenon. This study attempts to fill the gap by applying robust econometric strat-
egy and data from Uganda; a developing country characterized by increases in the number of pri-
vate hospitals amidst inadequate monitoring by the government. 
 
3.4 Theoretical Model 
In this section, I develop a model to link the behavior of physicians in PHC with the be-
havior of the expectant mothers. The model closely follows Hay and Leahy (1982) and Dranove 
(1988) but with new innovations and predictions. From the onset, it is important to note that most 
private hospitals in Uganda are set up by physicians. This implies that the profit objective of the 
PHCs is the same as the income maximization objective of the physicians. This follows Currie and 
MacLeod (2008) argument that the incentives of hospitals are not different from the incentives of 
physicians. 
54  
In building the model, I assume that the PHCs aim at profit maximization and they operate 
in a monopolistically competitive market. On the other hand, the expectant mothers aim at mini-
mization of adverse health outcomes subject to household wealth (Y). The ability of the healthcare 
facilities to perform CS procedures depends on the quality (F) of the healthcare facilities, the skill 
(D) of healthcare workers, and the diagnostic as well as surgical tools at their disposal. Let the 
bounded diagnostic skill (D) of the healthcare workers be denoted by: 
ܦ ∈ ( ܦ, ܦ )                                                                                                                      (3.1) 
Where D and ܦ  are the lowest and the highest healthcare skill levels, respectively. As in a standard 
agency problem, it is assumed that the physicians have superior information about delivery due to 
their training and experience. The expectant mothers are assumed to have medical information (H) 
about their health status and the likelihood of safe natural delivery. H is gained from medical his-
tory, education, social interactions, experience and antenatal care. It is assumed to be bounded 
such that: 
ܪ ∈ ൫ ܪ, ܪ ൯: ܪ ≤ ܦ                                                                                                      (3.2)                                     
Where H and ܪ are lowest and the highest maternal health knowledge possessed by the expectant 
mothers, respectively. The inequality in equation (3.2) indicates information asymmetry in which 
the most informed expectant mother is at best as informed as the least skilled maternal healthcare 
workers. Physicians have the potential to induce demand for CS based on their judgment about the 
benefit of CS birth, given the severity (z) of the medical condition of the expectant mother and the 
unborn child.  
The physician would also consider fee-for-service (P) to be charged, given medical 
knowledge (H) of the expectant mother about the likelihood of safe delivery. To minimize reputa-
tion damage, the physician would consider proposing CS   to expectant mothers at the margin of 
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natural delivery as well the cost of the CS. Over time, PHCs review their practice and adjust the 
frequency (Q) of induced CS, such that their reputation is not damaged and the PHC meets the 
profit objective. It is assumed that the gynecologists  gain utility from controlling severity (z) of 
conditions faced by expectant mothers, quality (F)of the hospital  as well as their own altruism  
(ߠ) for expectant mothers denoted  as : 
     ߤ(−ݖ, ܨ, ߠ)                                                                                                 (3.3) 
Utility is assumed be increasing in all the arguments in equation (3.3).  Physician also gains utility 
from income or the profit (ߨ) derived from induced-demand for CS. The profit is defined as the 
difference between total revenue derived from induced-demand for CS and the total cost of the 
service, ܥ(ܳ, ߠ, ܨ). Hence, the profit is symbolically defined as: 
 ߨ = ܳ. ܲ(ܳ, ܪ, ܨ) − ܥ(ܳ, ߠ, ܨ)                                                                                                   (3.4) 
The total utility of the physician who owns a private hospital/clinic is the sum of professional 
satisfaction and profit, denoted as:  
ܷ௉ு஼ = ߤ(−ݖ, ܨ, ߠ) + ܳ. ܲ(ܳ, ܪ, ܨ) − ܥ(ܳ, ߠ, ܨ)                                                                    (3.5)                                           
Per the Hippocratic Oath and ethical rules, ߤ(−ݖ, ܨ, ߠ)   is assumed to be independent of 
fee-for-service and the quantity of service provided. It follows that the maximization of the physi-
cian's utility with respect to induced demand for CS is identical to the profit maximization problem 
of the private healthcare facilities. Taking the first order condition for physician's utility maximi-
zation with respect to Q yields:  
డ௎ುಹ಴
డொ = ܲ(ܳ, ܪ, ܨ) + ܳ డ௉(ொ,ு,ி)డொ − డ஼(ொ,ఏ,ி)డொ = 0                                                           (3.6)       
Hence  ܲ(. ) ቀడ௉(ொ,ு,ி)డொ ொ௉ + 1ቁ = డ஼(ொ,ఏ,ி)డொ   . Or compactly,   ܲ(. ) ቀଵఌ + 1ቁ = ܯܥ(. )5                  (3.7) 
                                                     5 ߝ  is the price elasticity of demand. 
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Equation (3.7) indicates the profit maximizing condition of the private healthcare facilities. To 
analyze the effect of information asymmetry on the degree of induced demand for CS, a compar-
ative static analysis of equation (3.6) using the implicit function theorem yields: 
ௗொ
ௗு = − ൭
ങమು(ೂ,ಹ,ಷ)ങೂങಹ ାങು(ೂ,ಹ,ಷ)ങಹ
ങమು(ೂ,ಹ,ಷ)
ങೂమ ொାଶങು(ೂ,ಹ,ಷ)ങೂ ିങ಴(ೂ,ഇ,ಷ)ങೂమ
൱ < 0                                                                                 (3.8) 
The denominator of equation (3.8) is the second order condition for profit maximization 
and is negative on the assumption that a unique solution exist. The numerator is also negative since 
more informed patients (high ܪ) reduce the likelihood of induced-demand for CS. Thus, 
డమ௉(ொ,ு,ி)
డொడு < 0 and  డ௉(ொ,ு,ி)డு < 0 , which makes equation (3.8) negative. Therefore, the expectant 
mothers with better maternal health information (ܪ) are less likely to face physician induced-de-
mand for CS births. This shows that, on average, physicians can induce demand in the presence of 
information asymmetry. 
To link the behavior of physicians/healthcare providers with the behavior of the expectant 
mothers, I borrow a few ideas from Dranove (1988). In a static game theoretic framework, the 
expectant mothers or their caretakers have two strategies; either consent to or reject the induced-
demand for CS. This is done after weighing the cost and benefit of each of the strategies. The 
payoff (utility) depends on the chosen strategy. If the expectant mother accepts to undergo the 
demand-induced CS, the payoff is specified as: 
ܷௐ௖  =  ܧ(ܯ஼  )  + ஼ܸ(ܻ − ܲ )                                                                                    (3.9) 
Where ܧ(ܯ஼  ) is defined as the expected health status of the unborn child, which is unknown be-
fore birth, but if it were known to be adverse, clinically required CS would be performed.  The 
term ஼ܸ(ܻ − ܲ) defines the utility the expectant mother gains from residual wealth (ܻ − ܲ) after 
CS is performed at fee-for-service(ܲ).  
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Without CS, the health condition of the expectant mother could deteriorate. The health 
condition,ܯௐ, is assumed to be a function of the severity (z) prior to birth such that: 
ܯௐ = −ߜ(ݖ): ߜᇱ(ݖ) > 0                                                                                                                                                (3.10) 
If the expectant mother rejects the gynecologist’s suggestion for CS birth, her payoff is denoted 
as: 
ܷௐ = −ߜ(ݖ) + ܧ(ܯ஼) + ܸ(ܻ)                                                                                              (3.11) 
Where  ܸ(ܻ) represents the utility derived from keeping full wealth without going through cesar-
ean section birth. To decide on the optimal strategy, the expectant mother forms a belief about the 
severity of her condition given the medical advice and medical knowledge H. The belief follows 
a normal density function ݂(ݖ|ܪ, ߠ).  The expected payoff from rejecting induced-demand for CS 
is stylized as:   
− ׬ ߜ(ݖ)ஶିஶ  ݂(ݖ|ܪ, ߠ)݀ݖ + ܧ(ܯ஼) + ܸ(ܻ)                                                                              (3.12)                                  
Induced-demand for CS would be accepted if and only if the expected payoff of rejecting CS is 
less than the expected utility of undergoing CS. That is to say: 
− ׬ ߜ(ݖ)ஶିஶ  ݂(ݖ|ܪ, ߠ)݀ݖ + ܧ(ܯ஼) + ܸ(ܻ) ≤ ܧ(ܯ஼  )  + ஼ܸ(ܻ − ܲ)                                   (3.13)                         
Departing from Dranove (1988) from here onwards, I assume that in the worst case sce-
nario, the expected health condition of the unborn child is ignored to save the expectant mother's 
life. Then equation (3.13) reduces to: 
− ׬ ߜ(ݖ)ஶିஶ  ݂(ݖ|ܪ, ߠ)݀ݖ + ܸ(ܻ) ≤   ஼ܸ(ܻ − ܲ )                                                                   (3.14)  
The preceding equation can be inverted to solve for the price the expectant mother would be will-
ing to pay as ൬ܻ − ஼ܸିଵ ቀ− ׬ ߜ(ݖ)ஶିஶ  ݂(ݖ|ܪ, ߠ)݀ݖ + ܸ(ܻ)ቁ൰   ≤ ܲ . When CS is accepted,  
൬ܻ − ஼ܸିଵ ቀ− ׬ ߜ(ݖ)ஶିஶ  ݂(ݖ|ܪ, ߠ)݀ݖ + ܸ(ܻ)ቁ൰ =   ܲ                                                    (3.15) 
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Equation (3.15) is interpreted as a condition in which the price (ܲ) that the expectant 
mother is willing to pay implicitly depends on the expected utility gained from relieving severe 
health conditions during natural births and household income. It also implicitly defines the supplier 
induced-demand for cesarean sections as a function of   ܻ, ݖ,ܪ and ߠ. Substituting equation (3.15) 
into equation (3.7) yields: 
൬ܻ − ஼ܸିଵ ቀ− ׬ ߜ(ݖ)ஶିஶ  ݂(ݖ|ܪ, ߠ)݀ݖ + ܸ(ܻ)ቁ൰ ቀଵఌ + 1ቁ = ܯܥ(. )                                       (3.16) 
Equation (3.16) links the profit maximization condition of PHCs with the utility maximi-
zation condition of the expectant mothers. It implies that the marginal revenue of a PHC from 
induced demand for CS depends on expected health benefits as perceived by expectant mothers 
and household wealth (Y) and price elasticity of demand. This implies that expectant mothers who 
appear to be wealthy are more likely to face physician induced-demand.  Severity (z) of medical 
condition of the expectant is predicted to increase the likelihood of accepting CS while maternal 
healthcare knowledge (H) possessed by the expectant mothers is expected to reduce the likelihood 
of accepting it.  
The impact of the gynecologists’ concern (ߠ) for expectant mothers may increase or de-
crease the likelihood of CS, hence the sign is unknown a priori and it depends on adherence to 
professional ethics and altruism. From equations (3.15) and (3.16), an estimable equation for the 
likelihood of CS can be specified as a linear function of  ܻ, ݖ, ܪ , type of hospital (PHC), socioec-
onomic and demographic characteristics(X) and a stochastic term ߟ௜.Symbolically; 
  ܥܵ௜ = ߙ + ߚଵܲܪܥ +  ߚଶ ௜ܻ + ߚଷܪ௜ + ߚସݖ௜ + Γܺ௜ + ߟ௜                                                        (3.17) 
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3.5 Data 
The dataset for the empirical analysis comes from the 2011 Uganda Demographic and 
Health Survey (UDHS). It is a large cross sectional dataset collected by the Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics on behalf of Macro International and USAID. It contains data on demographic charac-
teristics, healthcare services, antenatal care, births, postnatal care, maternal, infant and child mor-
tality among others. It is a nationally representative data obtained through multistage cluster sam-
pling. The country is divided into clusters and then clusters are randomly selected to ensure repre-
sentativeness. Thereafter, households in clusters are randomly sampled for interviews. A total of 
18,674 women aged 15-49, and 2,295 men aged 15-54 were interviewed. The unit of observation 
in this study are women aged between 15-49 years and those who have had at least one birth in the 
5 year period preceding the survey.  
The dataset contains information on method of delivery, which can either be CS or natural 
birth. This is the dependent variable of interest. As a dummy variable, CS births are coded one 
while natural births are coded zero. The independent variable of interest is the place of delivery, 
which can be a private or government hospital/clinic. It is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
place of delivery is a PHC and zero if it is a publicly owned hospital.  
PHCs aim at profit maximization but government hospitals aim at improvement of social 
welfare. It is hypothesized that the difference in goals is associated with differences in the likeli-
hood of CS birth. It is plausible that distance to hospitals influences the choice of hospital but does 
not influence the choice of the method of delivery. In this way it is exogenous and can meet ex-
clusion restrictions for identification of the parameters. Data on distance was computed using 
global positioning system (GPS) data obtained from the Uganda DHS. During The Uganda DHS 
data collection, the latitude and longitudes of each sampled cluster is recorded and the data is 
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published with the main survey report. To construct distance, I obtained latitudes and longitudes 
of all hospitals in Uganda and then used ArcGIS to compute distance to the nearest hospital. It is 
assumed that households choose the nearest hospitals to reduce transportation costs and other in-
conveniences. If the difference is insignificant, then the quality and cost of maternal healthcare 
services will have more influence than distance. Table 6 indicates that there is statistically signif-
icant differences in mean distance for women who delivered at PHCs in comparison with govern-
ment hospitals. 
The decision-making power of the expectant mothers about health issues is included to 
capture their likely response to gynecologists’ recommendation of unexpected CS birth. An ex-
pectant mother who makes health decisions alone is more susceptible to inducement than the one 
who makes health decisions in consultation with the spouse. Decision making on health issues may 
also depend on culture, financial resources and position in the household (Stephenson et.al. 2006 
and Duong et al. 2004). The Uganda DHS dataset contains a categorical variable which indicate 
the person who makes the health decision for the sampled individuals. The decisions involve when 
and where to seek medical care. This can be the individual, spouse, jointly or someone else. It 
potentially affects the likelihood of accepting or rejecting unexpected CS birth. 
The dataset also contains information on antenatal visits during which expectant mothers 
obtain advice about the likelihood of safe delivery. The type of health professional who provided 
antenatal care (ANC) is also contained in the dataset. This includes physicians, nurses or midwives. 
Due to skill levels (D), information acquired from physicians (ANC-doctor) is superior to that 
obtained from nurses or midwives.  Previous studies show that  ܣܰܥ influences the choice of place 
of delivery and the method of birth (Mishra and Rutherford, 2008). A dummy variable is con-
structed to indicate the type of personnel who provided the last ANC service. 
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A proxy measure of hospital quality is also included as a control. It is assumed that the 
quality of hospital influences the expectant mothers' choice as well the ability of the hospital to 
perform CS procedures. It is difficult to objectively measure quality as it depends on experiences 
and perception of the healthcare services provided. Inclusion of the variable is guided by previous 
literature such as Thaddeus and Maine (1994), and Mesko et al. (2003). The number of hospital 
beds is used as proxy. Data on the number of hospital beds for each district is obtained from ad-
ministrative records of Uganda's Ministry of Health. A dummy variable to capture complications 
experienced during child birth is also included in the model since it increases the likelihood of 
clinically necessary CS. The Uganda DHS dataset contain information on complications which 
expectant mothers were informed about during ANC visits and complications during the time of 
birth. 
Data on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the households and expectant 
mothers are also used in the analysis. For instance, the age of expectant mothers influences the 
likelihood of CS. Burgard (2004) and Reynolds et al. (2006) discuss how an increase in maternal 
age increases risks at child birth. Age also indicates experience in child birth and utilization of 
healthcare services as explained in Navaneetham and Dharmalingam (2002). It is assumed that 
older expectant mothers would be more confident to reject physician suggestion of unnecessary 
CS births. In the dataset, age is grouped into categories of 15-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-44 and 45-49 
years. When a household is expecting a child, expenditure towards healthcare increases tremen-
dously. The cost may include transportation, medication and supplies, and healthcare fee-for-ser-
vice among others. Therefore, household's wealth (Y) may influence the choice of place of delivery 
and the method of delivery. It also influences the response to physician induced-demand for CS. 
Poor households are less likely to utilize PHCs or afford to pay for CS in private hospitals.  
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In the Uganda DHS dataset, wealth index is used as a cumulative measure of a household's 
possessions and hence wealth. It is calculated using principal component analysis on the basis of 
household assets, housing conditions as well type and access to water. The index is divided into 
quintiles with the first quintile consisting of the poorest households and the last quintile comprising 
of the richest. Household wealth influences elective CS (Hannah, 2004, Glei et. al., 2003, and 
Stephenson and Tsui, 2002). Inclusion of wealth index helps to capture self-selected CS as well as 
the likelihood of yielding to induced-demand.  
Marital status also influences the choice of place of delivery through health decision mak-
ing power and ability to pay for CS procedures. In contrast to married expectant mothers, single 
or divorced expectant mothers may face greater financial constraints though they might exercise 
greater autonomy on health decision making (Duong et al. 2004). A categorical variable is con-
structed to indicate the marital status of the mothers. 
 Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 6. After dropping all home 
births, the sample decreased to 4,421 observations of which 1,079 occurred at PHCs while 3,342 
were at public-sector hospitals. The sample indicates that 10 percent of all births were through CS. 
About 11 percent of births at PHCs were through CS but the rate is 10 percent at government 
owned hospitals. The difference in proportion of deliveries by CS at PHC and government hospi-
tals is insignificant before controlling for socioeconomic characteristics. The data also indicate 
that decision making about women's health issues were mainly made by the expectant mothers 
(38.7 percent) and also jointly with the spouse (37.7 percent) for the overall sample. The pattern 
is similar for the PHC and government hospital sub-samples.  For expectant mothers from house-
holds in the top wealth quintile, 43.6 percent delivered their babies at PHCs while 28 percent gave 
birth in public sector hospitals, therefore, wealth influences the choice of place of delivery. 
63  
3.6 Econometric Strategy 
The choice between natural birth and CS birth is a binary decision and hence most previous 
studies applied binary choice models.  In a study of physician induced-demand, Hay and Leahy 
(1982) used the Linear Probability Model (OLS), Cromwell and Mitchell (1986) used a two stage 
least squares method (2SLS), Gruber and Owings (1996), Gruber et al.  (1999) and Grant (2009) 
used logistic regressions. In this study, I apply a bivariate probit method and compare the results 
with probit, OLS, instrumental variable probit and multilevel probit estimates. The rationale for 
using the bivariate probit model is hinged on the sequence of choice. First, the expectant mother 
decides on whether to deliver from a PHC or a government hospital. At the hospital, delivery is 
either by CS or natural mode. It is plausible that the choice of type of hospital and the method of 
delivery are correlated.  Indeed, the dataset shows that the tetrachoric correlation between the de-
cisions to deliver at a PHC and delivery through CS is 0.23 with a standard error of 0.031. This 
indicates that CS and delivery at private healthcare facilities are not statistically independent. It 
then follows that estimation using a bivariate probit regression is more efficient than equation by 
equation estimation. This is because correlation between the dummy variables may introduce en-
dogeneity in OLS or univariate probit. However, the recursive structure of bivariate probit and 
other exogenous variables improves model identification as discussed in Jones (2007). 
Using a latent variable approach, the unobservable utility associated with choice of type of 
healthcare facility for delivery is influenced by observables ( ଵܺ) including the stochastic disturb-
ance term ߳ଵas part of the data generating process. It is specified as: 
ݕଵ∗ = ܺଵߚଵ + ߳ଵ                                                                                                                        (3.17) 
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The choice of place of delivery is observable from data, and coded one if birth took place 
at a ܲܪܥ(ݕଵ) but zero if birth was at a publicly owned hospital/clinic as shown in the equation 
below. 
ݕଵ = ൜ 1 ݂݅ ݕଵ∗ > 00 ݂݅ ݕଵ∗  ≤ 0                                                                                                                   (3.18) 
The decision on method of delivery is made at the healthcare facility. Birth is either by natural 
mode or by CS. The latent variable for birth by CS (ݕଶ)  depends on observable covariates (ܺଶ), 
the place of delivery (ݕଵ) in addition to the stochastic disturbance term ߳ଶ as part of the data 
generating process and is symbolically denoted as: 
ݕଶ∗ = ܺଶߚଶ + ߣݕଵ + ߳ଶ                                                                                                             (3.19)                                                                           
Information on the method of delivery (natural or CS) is observable and defined as: 
ݕଶ = ൜ 1 ݂݅ ݕଶ∗ > 00 ݂݅ ݕଶ∗  ≤ 0                                                                                                                   (3.20) 
With the assumption that ߳ଵ and that ߳ଶ are normally distributed, the joint distribution of the dis-
turbance term is denoted as: 
ቂቀఢభఢమቁ | ଵܺ, ܺଵቃ ~ܰ ൤൫଴଴൯, ൬1 ߩߩ 1൰൨                                                                                   (3.21) 
The measure of correlation (ߩ)  between the stochastic terms  ߳ଵ and ߳ଶwould be statistically dif-
ferent from zero if the decisions on place of delivery and CS are correlated. As shown in Greene 
(2012), estimation of this system of equations as a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit is more 
efficient than single equation estimation. The parameters to be estimated via the likelihood func-
tion are specified as: 
ܮ(ߚଵ, ߚଶ, ߣ) = ෑ ݌ݎ(ݕଵ = 1, ݕଶ = 1|ߚଵ, ߚଶ, ߣ)௬భ௬మ  ݌ݎ(ݕଵ = 0, ݕଶ = 1|ߚଵ, ߚଶ, ߣ)(ଵି௬భ)௬మ  × 
      ݌ݎ(ݕଵ = 1, ݕଶ = 0|ߚଵ, ߚଶ, ߣ)௬భ(ଵି௬మ ) ݌ݎ(ݕଵ = 0, ݕଶ = 0|ߚଵ, ߚଶ, ߣ)(ଵି௬భ)(ଵି௬మ)     (3.22) 
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However, the estimate of main interest is joint and conditional probability of delivery by 
CS given delivery at a PHC. The joint probability of delivery at a PHC and by CS is defined as: 
݌ݎ(ݕଵ = 1, ݕଶ = 1) = ׬ ׬ ߶ଶ(߳ଵ, ߳ଶ, ߩ)௑మఉమାఒ௬భିஶ௑భఉభିஶ ݀߳ଶ݀߳ଵ = ߶ଶ(ܺଵߚଵ, Xଶ ߚଶ, ߩ)                 (3.23) 
The probability of delivery by CS conditional on delivery at a PHC is defined as: 
݌ݎ(ܥܵ|ܲܪܥ) = ௣௥(஼ௌ∩௉ு஼)௣௥(௉ு஼) = థమ(௑భఉభ,ଡ଼మ ఉమ,ఘ)థ(ଡ଼భ ఉభ)                                                                           (3.24) 
Where ߶ଶis the bivariate normal density function and ߶(Xଵ ߚଵ) is the marginal probability of de-
livery at a private hospital. The parameters are identifiable and Wilde (2000) shows that recursive 
bivariate probit requires no exclusion restrictions if there is sufficient variation in the data provided 
each equation contains at least one exogenous explanatory variable. Jones (2007) also shows that 
variation in exogenous variables ensures “identification by functional form.” However, this de-
pends on the strong assumption of the bivariate normality of the residuals. To avoid potential en-
dogeneity problems, in the maximum likelihood estimation, the exclusion restriction is met by 
including distance to hospital and marital status in the choice of place of delivery as defined in 
equation (3.18) but excluded from equation (3.20). 
 It is assumed that distance and marital status influences the choice of place of delivery due 
to cost considerations but have no influence on the method of delivery. Complications during de-
livery is included in the equation for method of delivery but excluded from the choice of place of 
delivery due to recursive sequences of events. 
 
3.6.1 Multilevel Mixed Effects Model  It is also plausible that the choice of hospitals and method of delivery have correlated ran-
dom effects given the sequence of the binary choices. This can be modeled as multi-level or clus-
tered choices and estimated as a combination of fixed and random effects.   Multilevel analysis 
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accounts for variance in the dependent variable that is measured at the lowest unit of analysis since 
it considers information at all levels (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002).  This reduces the likelihood 
of using incorrect standard errors when making statistical inferences. In this study, an expectant 
mother can choose between home delivery and hospital delivery, then between private and public 
hospitals, and finally natural or CS birth. This provides three levels of decisions nested in the 
choice of  the place of delivery. My interest is to estimate the impact of private hospitals on CS. 
Consequently, the level of choice reduces to two; hospital against home delivery and then private 
versus government hospitals. Mixed effects models contain both fixed effects and random effects 
and the maximum likelihood estimation provides both the fixed effects coefficients as well as var-
iances and covariance as shown in equation (3.25). 
ݕ௝௞ = ௝ܺ௞ߚ + ௝ܼ௞ଶ ܷ௞ + ௝ܼ௞ଷ ܷ௞ + ߝ௝௞                                                                                           (3.25) 
For ݅ = 1. . . . ݆݊݇, first level observations nested within ݆ =  1,2 of the second level group which 
are nested within ݇ =  1,2  of the third level group. In this case, the level 2 nests hospital and home 
delivery while the third level nests hospital types (PHCs or government hospitals), respec-
tively. ݆ܺ݇ represents the fixed effects component while  ௝ܼ௞ଶ ܷ௞ and  ௝ܼ௞ଷ ܷ௞ are the random parts in 
the second and third level choices and ߝ௝௞ is  the overall error term.  A more detailed literature on 
three level mixed effects probit can be found in Liu and Hedeker (2006). 
 
3.7 Results 
In all the estimations, survey sample weights are applied to correct sample bias and ensure 
representativeness of the observations. Clustered robust standard errors (at the enumeration area 
level) are estimated to account for heterogeneity of the enumeration areas. Due to missing data on 
some variables, only 2,465 observations are used in the estimation. The first stage bivariate probit 
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estimate, which helps to check for identification of parameters is displayed in Table 7. The esti-
mates show that distance influences the choice of place of delivery but does not influence the mode 
of delivery. This indicates that the exclusion restriction necessary for model identification is satis-
fied. The Wald ߯2 (47) with p-value of 0.000 indicates that the residuals in equations (17) and (19) 
are indeed correlated and the bivariate probit model fits the data well. The coefficients are probit 
indices for equations (3.18) and (3.20), respectively.  
The second stage analysis involves obtaining the conditional probability of birth by CS 
given that birth took place at PHCs. The estimates in terms of average marginal effects are pre-
sented in Table 8. For comparison purposes, results from other possible methods of estimation are 
presented alongside the main one. Column (1) contains OLS estimates, which indicates that there 
is no statistically significant impact of PHC on the probability of CS. Other plausible specifica-
tions, such as Instrumental Variable (IV) probit, is in Column (2), probit estimates are contained 
in Column (3) and Fixed Effects (FE) results are in Column (4). The coefficient of PHC in Col-
umns (1), (2), (3), and (4) indicate that there is no statistically significant impact of PHC on the 
likelihood of CS. 
 However, the bivariate probit estimate in Column (5) indicates that if birth takes place at 
a PHC rather than at a government hospital, the probability of CS increases by 6.1 percent. Thus, 
the naive methods which do not consider the recursive sequence of choices and ignore the corre-
lation between the residuals are not suitable for this analysis. The bivariate probit estimates indi-
cate that the likelihood of CS is higher in PHCs in comparison to publicly owned hospitals. There-
fore, the profit objectives of PHCs may influence the extent to which CS is recommended given 
complications and other medical factors which impact the likelihood of an expectant mother de-
livering through CS.  
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The results show that physicians in private hospitals in Uganda are likely to induce demand 
for some services just like their counterparts in developed market economies. For instance, De 
Regt et al. (1986) reviewed 65,647 deliveries in four Brooklyn hospitals between 1977 and 1982, 
and found that private physicians performed significantly more cesarean sections than attending 
physicians. In Uganda, few households have medical insurance, so those who go to private hospi-
tals pay fee-for service. The physicians in the PHCs would know that the patients can afford the 
costs since they could choose to go to subsidized publicly funded hospital. Though hospitals are 
responsible for all procedures that take place on its premises, physicians decide on the appropriate 
procedures. Hence, the positive impact of PHCs on CS is indicative of physician induced-demand. 
The finding is comparable to Belizan et al. (1999) who show that a greater proportion of CS births 
in Latin America were performed at private hospitals. 
Relating the results to information asymmetry as modeled in the theoretical setup, the im-
pact of health decision making power is weakly significant. Specifically, if a spouse makes most 
decisions for the expectant mothers, the likelihood of CS decreases by about 1.8 percent. This 
implies that if health decisions are made by expectant mothers only, the likelihood of CS would 
increase. It is plausible that expectant mother can be influenced by physicians during childbirth as 
it is a critical time with a high degree of uncertainty. However, the expectant mother is more in-
formed about her health condition than the spouse. Hence, the estimate could indicate the influence 
of decision making power rather than information asymmetry. It is only a proxy and should be 
interpreted with this caveat. 
The theoretical model also indicates that household wealth (Y) affects the likelihood of 
induced-demand for CS. The higher the household wealth, the higher the risk aversion and will-
ingness to accept induced-demand for CS. The marginal effect of the wealth index explains part 
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of idiosyncratic preference for CS. The result shows that on average, moving from the poorest to 
other wealth quintiles increases the likelihood of CS. The impact is statistically stronger and larger 
for an expectant mother in the top wealth quintile. This suggests that wealth significantly affects 
the likelihood of CS as predicted in the theoretical model. Other covariates such as, parity, age of 
the mother at child birth, education and pregnancy complications were controlled for and their 
marginal effects are statically significant with expected signs. 
 
3.7.1 Robustness Check Results 
It is possible that the estimates discussed in the preceding section could have been influ-
enced by the model specification. To check for the robustness of the estimates, additional regres-
sions were performed and the results are reported in Table 9. In Column (1) the dummy variable 
indicting complicated delivery was excluded from the CS equation. The conditional probability of 
CS given delivery at a PHC remains statistically significant with a slight increase to 6.8 percent. 
The impact of the wealth index and health decision making remains close to the full model of 
Table 8. 
 The estimates in Column (2) in Table 9 are obtained after adding regional dummy indica-
tors as a control to the full model. The impact of PHCs on the conditional probability of delivery 
by CS remains statistically strong though the magnitude decreases to about 5.4 percent. This indi-
cates some regional differences in CS rates, accessibility to services or some fixed effects. For 
instance, deliveries in Central and Northern regions increase the likelihood of CS. On the contrary, 
giving birth in East Central, West Nile and Western regions reduces the probability of CS. Overall, 
the impact of PHCs, household wealth and health decision making power remains robust.  
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Column (3) contains the estimates obtained by adding an indicator for antenatal care pro-
vided by an obstetrician/gynecologist in both CS and PHC equations. This is meant to capture risks 
assessed by specialists and subsequent CS births. Antenatal care provided by a doctor increases 
the likelihood of both delivery at PHCs and CS births. The marginal effect of PHCs on CS births 
decrease to about 5.1 percent but is still statistically significant at the one percent level. 
 To check the possibility that a multilevel model could be appropriate, the coefficients are 
presented in Column (4) of Table 9. The estimate is positive but statistically insignificant. The 
likelihood ratio (LR) test of the fixed effects regression as an appropriate model against the probit 
model rejects the null hypothesis. Therefore, multilevel mixed effects probit does not fit the data 
well. This could be from the fact that 43 percent of births were home deliveries and cesarean 
sections cannot be performed in such environments.  
 In all the previous analyses, I used distance to the nearest hospital as one factor which 
influences the choice of hospital. However, the difference in distance between the nearest govern-
ment hospital and the nearest private hospital could play a significant role in influencing choices. 
I used the geographical information system data for sample clusters and hospitals and I constructed 
the differential distance6. The map of Uganda in Figure 5 indicates the location of hospitals and 
clusters from which samples were drawn.  
The OLS, Probit, IV Probit, bivariate probit and mixed effect probit estimates are presented 
in Columns (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) of  Table 10. The coefficient of the dummy variable for private 
hospitals are statistically insignificant in Columns (1) ,(2), (3) and (5), which indicates that the 
specifications do not take care of the recursive structure of events. However, the bivariate probit 
                                                     6  Differential Distance is defined as the difference between distance to nearest hospital and nearest private hos-pital  
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estimate in Column (4) is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level.  From these 
regressions with varying specifications, the magnitude of the conditional probability of delivery 
through CS changes slightly but the statistical significance remains unchanged in the bivariate 
model. The impact of PHCs, wealth and health decision making is fairly stable. This implies that 
the main result explains the phenomenon and the recursive bivariate model is appropriate for the 
analysis. 
 
3.8 Discussion 
This study sought to test the impact of place of delivery on the likelihood of cesarean sec-
tion births in Uganda. The estimates show that, on average, the probability of CS is higher in 
private healthcare facilities. The identification of the impact relied on a seemingly unrelated re-
gression (SUR) of the choice of place of delivery as an endogenous determinant of the method of 
delivery (CS or natural birth). Distance from hospital and marital status were used as an exclusion 
restriction since they influence the choice of hospital but not the method of delivery. Overall, the 
empirical results indicate that place of delivery influences the method of birth.  
Privately owned healthcare facilities often operate as a business whilst observing profes-
sional ethics. In the case of delivery, the critical situation and uncertainty surrounding safety cre-
ates an environment for supplier-induced demand. In Uganda, the inspection and regulation of 
private hospitals is rather weak. There is absence of standardized rules for reporting the costs of 
healthcare services. This compounds information asymmetry and the likelihood of induced-de-
mand. It does not necessarily mean that all CS performed at PHCs were due to demand induce-
ment. Some CS could be due to complications, self-request by expectant mothers or repeated CS. 
Lo (2008) notes that culture influences the method of delivery and some CS are a result of an initial 
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CS irrespective of the financial gains to gynecologists. In terms of maternal health policy, the 
results show that there is a need for closer monitoring and regulation of CS in private hospitals in 
Uganda. As much as physicians have fiduciary responsibility to patients, they might not necessary 
fulfill their obligations all the time. Principal-agent problems in physician-patient relationships 
may lead to adverse health outcomes and misallocation of scarce healthcare resources. Smith et al. 
(1997) advocates for a mechanism to control remuneration of hospitals for additional patients and 
hospital managements need to exercise control over physicians to reduce principal agent problems. 
This might reduce supplier-induced demand for healthcare services such as CS procedures. 
There are some caveats in regards to the findings. As much as the theoretical model explic-
itly links the profit motive of physicians in private hospitals with the utility maximization of pa-
tients, the empirical results should be interpreted with caution. This is because it was impossible 
to differentiate the CS which was induced by physicians from the clinically required ones. I relied 
on the difference in objectives of the private and the public-sector healthcare facilities.  
Secondly, there was no data on the cost, yet it is one of the key determinants of accessing 
service from private hospitals. This study indicates the need for more detailed hospital level data 
in Uganda. To date, there is no uniform reporting format for private hospitals. The basic infor-
mation reported to government pertains to healthcare personnel and physical infrastructure. Hos-
pitals could be required to report expectant mothers' preference for cesarean sections as a method 
of delivery. This could help unravel self-selected cesarean section births vis-a-vis physician in-
duced-demand for CS or those that were unavoidable. 
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3.9 Conclusion 
This study provides a theoretical model which shows an explicit link between the profit 
incentives of private hospitals with the utility maximization objective of expectant mothers in the 
presence of information asymmetry. The model shows that physician induced-demand increases 
with information asymmetry. The study used data from the Uganda Demographic and Health Sur-
veys (2011). 
 A recursive bivariate probit model and other plausible specifications were used in the es-
timation. The estimates indicate that the likelihood of cesarean section birth increases for deliveries 
that takes place at private hospitals. The increase in the number of private hospitals due to eco-
nomic liberalization of the 1990s seems to influence the degree to which physicians recommend 
procedures such as CS. Although I was not able to isolate repeat CS, after controlling for compli-
cations and wealth, there is still strong evidence that private hospitals are more likely to recom-
mend CS births than government hospitals. Given the difference in the goals (profit versus social 
welfare) of the private and public hospitals, physician induced-demand for CS could be one of the 
driving force behind rising CS births in Uganda. Thus there is need for policies to monitor and 
regulate private hospitals. Regulation can reduce waste of scarce resources and save households 
from avoidable costs and risks associated with CS births. This, in a way, may improve maternal 
healthcare in line with the Millennium Development Goal 5. 
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Table 6:   Summary Statistics by Place of Delivery 
Variable Overall Private Hospital GOVT Hospital Differences C-section 0.099  0.106 0.097 0.009  (0.299) (0.307) (0.296) (0.014) ANC Doctor 0.155 0.209 0.137 0.072***  (0.361) (0.407) (0.344) (0.011) Age 27.99 28.27 27.903 0.367  (6.718) (6.612) (6.751) (0.232) Insured 0.02 0.04 0.014 0.026***  (0.14) (0.197) (0.119) (0.006) Primary Education 0.57 0.505 0.601 -0.096***  (0.493) (0.500) (0.489) (0.017) Secondary Education 0.256 0.306 0.239 0.67***  (0.436) (0.406) (0.426) (0.016) Higher Education 0.067 0.097 0.055 0.042***  (0.249) (0.296) (0.228) (0.001) 
2nd Wealth Quintile 0.178 0.147 0.186 -0.039***  (0.378) (0.355) (0.389) (0.013) 3rd  Wealth Quintile 0.175 0.151 0.181 0.03**  (0.380) (0.358) (0.385) (0.013) 4th Wealth Quintile 0.165 0.175 0.161 0.014  (0.371) (0.380) (0.368) (0.013) 5th  Wealth Quintile 0.320 0.436 0.280 0.156***  (0.466) (0.496) (0.280) (0.015) Parity 3.61 3.63 3.61 0.02  (2.26) (2.29) (2.25) (0.08) Distance 51.59 32.51 57.67 -25.16  (323.29) (231.14) (347.14) (9.255) Health Decision(Self) 0.386 0.349 0.398 -0.049**  (0.487) (0.477) (0.489) (0.017) Health Decision(Spouse) 0.378 0.411 0.367 0.044**  (0.484) (0.492) (0.482) (0.017) Health Decision (SM) 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.001  (0.059) (0.047) (0.062) (0.002) Observations 4421 1079 3342 4420  Notes:  p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. The differences are differences in means of the variables. The means of dummy variables are proportions. GOVT Hospital indicates govern-ment owned and operated hospitals/clinics.  ANC-doctors is a dummy variable which shows that the last antenatal care before delivery was provided by a physician other than nurses or midwives. Insured indicates whether an expectant mother had medical insurance at the time of giving birth. Health Decision(SM) indi-cates that someone who is not a family member makes medical decisions.   
80  
Table 7:   First Stage Bivariate Probit Results 
Variable PHC C-Section 
Private Hospital  1.013   (0.3861) Insured 0.040 0.479**  (0.212) (0.244) ANC Doctor 0.196**   (0.093)  Health Decision (joint) -0.119 0.1362  (0.101) (0.110) Health Decisions (Husband) 0.009 -0.246**  (0.0926) (0.108) Health Someone else 0.172 -0.555  (0.469) (0.513) Age Group (20-29) 0.276** -0.0367  (0.135) (0.164) Age Group 30-39) 0.313** 0.136  (0.149) (0.212) Age Group 40-44) 0.552*** 0.096  (0.200) (0.314) Age Group 45-49) 0.476* 0.380  (0.267) (0.392) 
2nd  Wealth Quintile 0.336 0.309*  (0.134) (0.179) 
3rd Wealth  Quintile 0.287 0.266  (0.146) (0.187) 
4th  Wealth Quintile 0.484 0.408  (0.02) (0.190) 
5th  Wealth Quintile 0.658 0.457  (0.268) (0.179)  Distance -0.007***   (0.002)  Time Fixed Effects YES YES Other Controls y YES YES N 2401 2465 ߩ = 0.302 Wald ߯2 ( 43) =6329.54***  Notes:  p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. ANCdoctor = Antenatal Care provided by a physician. The method of estimation is seemingly unrelated bivariate probit. One equation defines the choice of place of delivery and another defines the method of delivery. The statistically significant  ߩ indi-cates that the model assumption of bivariate probit holds.
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 Table 8:   Impact of Hospital Type on the Probability of Cesarean Sections 
 Notes: *p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. CS denotes birth through cesarean section while PHC indicates delivery at a private sector hospital.  Other controls include pregnancy complications, long labor period, distance to hospital, education, antenatal care by physicians and age. The estimates in Columns (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) are obtained from OLS, Instrumental Variable (IV) Probit, Probit, Fixed Effects and bivariate probit regressions, respectively. All estimates in Columns (1)-(4) are average marginal effects. The estimates in column (5) indicates the probability of CS birth con-ditional on delivery in a private hospital.  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Variables OLS IVProbit Probit FE Biprobit Private Hospital (PHC) -0.012 0.141 -0.074 -0.016 0.061***  (0.016)  (0.123) (0.099) (0.021) (0.015) Poorer Wealth Index 0.033  0.283 0.005** 0.018**  (0.020)  (0.186) (0.025) (0.009) Middle Wealth Index 0.006  0.151 -0.001 0.014  (0.022)  (0.201) (0.003) (0.009) Richer Wealth Index 0.047*  0.323 0.043 0.028**  (0.025)  (0.200) (0.031) (0.013) Richest Wealth Index 0.018  0.194 0.019 0.037***  (0.024)  (0.197) (0.035) (0.014) Health decision (joint) 0.034  -0.193* -0.033 -0.014  (0.020)  0.117) 0.023) 0.009) 
Health Decisions (Husband) -0.041**  -0.026 -0.035 -0.018  (0.020)  (0.117) (0.022) (0.011) Health Decisions (Someone else) -0.114***  -0.576 -0.006 -0.031  (0.030)  (0.494) 0.055) (0.022) 
Number of Births -0.015** -0.014*** -0.092 -0.008 -0.005  (0.005) (0.005) (0.034) (0.006) (0.003) Complicated Delivery 0.037*** 0.221*** 0.034*** 0.064*** 0.014***  (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.045) (0.007) Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES Other Controls  YES YES YES YES YES N 2403 2401 2401 2406 2406 R2 Pseudo R2 0.111  0.144 0.285  ߯2 for Wald test  163*** 156.98*** 6329 4958 
82  
Table 9:   Robustness Check showing probability of CS conditional on PHC 
Variable  (1) (2)  (3)   (4) Private Hospital(PHC) 0.068*** 0.054 *** 0.051*** 0.093  (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) (0.277) Poorer Wealth Index 0.012 .019* 0.0208* 0.154  (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.148) Richer Wealth Index 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.141  (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.153) Richest Wealth Index 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.234  (0.008) (0.014) (0.016) (0.149) Health decision (joint) -0.013 -0.0135 -0.0134 -0.221**  (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) (0.092) Health Decisions (Husband) -0.0159 -0.018 -0.019 -0.234**  (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.094) Health Decisions (Someone else) -0.027 0.028 -0.0354 -0.143  (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) (0.545) Number of Births -0.005 -0.009** -0.01*** -0.100***  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.027) Complicated Delivery  0.016*** .017*** 0.204***   (0.005) (0.006) (0.022) Central Region 1  0.008*** 0.008     (0.002) (0.003)  Central Region 2  0.041*** 0.039***    (0.011) (0.012)  East Central  -0.054*** -0.053    (0.006) (0.007)  Northern Region  0.0285*** 0.026**    (0.012) (0.012)  West Nile  Region  -0.0399*** -0.040    (0.005) (0.995)  Western Region  -0.0418** -0.0418***    (0.004) (0.004)  ANCdoctor   0.021**     (0.0101)  Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Other Controls YES YES YES YES N 2414 2406 2406 2425 ߯2 for Wald test 3102.34*** 2410.9*** 2833.7***  LR test Fixed Effects vs Probit regression    27.35***  Notes:  Clustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * p < 0.1; **p < 0.05  ***p < 0.01 respectively. Estimates in Columns (1) - (3) are from bivariate probit and Column (4) is from multilevel mixed effects (ME) probit. The bivariate equations contain place of delivery (PHC) and method of delivery (CS) as de-pendent variables.  
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Table 10:   Robustness Check with Differential Distance 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (OLS) (Probit) (IVprobit) (Biprobit) (MEprobit) Private Hospital (PHC) -0.010 -0.011 0.101 0.056*** 0.090  (0.016) (.015) (0.101) (0.016) (0.277) Poorer Wealth Index 0.035* 0.046*  0.022 0.146  (.020) (0.024)  (0.01) (0.149) Middle Wealth Index 0.006 0.014  0.008 -0.07  (0.022) (0.024)  (0.009) (0.161) Richer Wealth Index 0.047* 0.052*  0.021* 0.138  (0.025) (0.027)  (0.013) (0.153) Richest Wealth Index 0.019 0.032  0.013 0.222  (0.024) (0.024)  (0.013) (0.150) Health decision (joint) -0.034 -0.036*  -0.014 -0.220***  (0.020) (0.019)  (0.010) (0.093) Health Decisions (Husband) -0.04** -0.041**  -0.017** -0.232**  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.010) (0.095) Health Decisions (Someone else) -0.114*** -0.068  -0.051 -0.147  (0.029) (0.056)  (0.0163) (0.544) Number of Births -0.014 0.014** -0.014*** -0.008** -0.101**  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.027) Complicated Delivery 0.057*** 0.0375***  .016 0.202  (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.022) Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES Regional Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES N 2403 2398 2398 2403 2398 ߯2 for Wald test  135.70*** 150*** 4.22*** 141.67*** R2 0.111     Notes:  *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Clustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All parameter esti-mates are average marginal effects. Methods of estimation by column: (1) OLS, (2) Probit, (3) IV probit, (4) Bivariate Probit, and (5) Multilevel probit mixed effects.  Other controls include: pregnancy complica-tions, long labor period, distance to hospital, education, antenatal care by physicians, and age. The first stage bivariate probit index shows that delivery at private hospitals is positively influenced by the differ-ence between the distance to nearest nearest public and private hospital. The distance does not influence the likelihood of cesarean section birth.        
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Figure 5:   Hospital Locations and Survey Clusters 
                                      Green lines indicate the shortest distance from a sampled cluster to a government hospital (green circle). Brown lines indicate the shortest distance to the nearest private hospitals (brown circle). Purple dots indicate clusters from which households were sampled by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics but were “displaced” by some factors to protect the confidentiality of respondents. Technical assistance in creating this map was provided by Mr. Richard McKenzie, a GIS specialist at the USF Library.     
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Chapter 4: Agricultural Extension and Household Food Consumption  
4.1 Introduction  
The first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) set a target of reducing extreme poverty 
and hunger by one half of its 1990 level by the year 2015.  Progress towards the achievement of 
MDG1 is measured using indicators such  as the proportion of population living on less than one 
US dollar a day,  the poverty gap ratio,  the share of the poorest quintile in national income or 
consumption, the prevalence of underweight children and the proportion of population that is un-
dernourished. Undernourishment is measured by a distribution function of dietary energy con-
sumption per person as defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). However, nour-
ishment requires some minimum level of food intake, which in turn depends on food availability. 
On the other hand, data from the 2005/06 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) show that 
the average calorific intake was 1,970 calories per person per day. This is short of the recom-
mended minimum calorific requirement of 2,200 calories.  According to the 2014 Uganda National 
Population and Housing Census report, 11.8 percent of the population have less than two meals 
per day (UBOS, 2016). This represents about 4.5 million persons. The World Food Program 
(WFP) also notes that between 2009 and 2010, 48 percent of Ugandans were energy deficient, 14 
percent of children were stunted and 20 percent had lower than normal food intake (WFP, 2013).  
Other indicators of poor nutrition in Uganda are the 5 percent of rural households who are food 
insecure, 31 percent were highly vulnerable, and 19 percent moderately vulnerable (WFP, 2005).  
Therefore an inadequate food supply is still a problem in many households in Uganda. 
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 On the other hand, a number  studies have shown that household nutrition influences edu-
cation outcomes, health status, human capital accumulation, labor productivity, and welfare (Hod-
dinott  et al.,2008,  Chen and Zhou, 2007,  Behrman et al. , 2004,  Alderman et al. 2012,  and  
Victora et al., 2008). Programs which can reduce the vulnerability of households can improve food 
security and welfare. Fanzo and Pronyk (2011) suggest that intervention in agricultural production 
can increase food availability and intake. In Uganda, the National Agricultural Advisory Services 
(NAADS) was established in 2001 as a strategy to promote new farming technologies through a 
farmer demanded agricultural extension model. The goals of the NAADS program include the 
promotion of food security, nutrition and household income. Participating households select to 
receive desired farm extension services, inputs and advice on marketing the farm outputs. 
This study examines the impact of NAADS on household food intake in Uganda. Previous 
studies such as Benin et al. (2011),   Friis-Hansen et al. (2004), Okoboi et al. (2013), and Diiro and 
Sam (2015) examined the impact of NAADS on technology adoption, farm output, farm revenue, 
and synergy with other agricultural service providers. To my knowledge, this the first study which 
examines the impact of NAADS on household food consumption and provides new results and 
extends the growing literature on the impact of agricultural extension in Uganda. 
In the analysis, a dummy variable (MEAL) is created such that it is equal to one if a house-
hold always has at least two meals in a day, but zero otherwise. This measure of food availability 
is built on the rationale that hunger can be objectively measured as suggested by Radmer et al. 
(1992) and Kendall et al. (1995). Whereas many studies use anthropometric measures as indicators 
of food security, the measures can be influenced by diseases and other factors even if food is 
available. On the other hand, the frequency of food intake is indicative of a household’s food 
supply which influences nutrition and welfare. Furthermore, the WFP (2013) and UBOS (2016) 
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consider Ugandan households which have less than two meals a day as being vulnerable to food 
insecurity. The main empirical methods employed in the study are a linear probability model 
(OLS) and fixed effects (FE) regressions. This enables interpretation of the estimates as causal 
effects. The dataset used in the study comes from two waves of the Uganda National Household 
Survey (UNHS) which was conducted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics in 1999/2000 and 
2005/2006. The NAADS program was established in 2001, consequently, I use the 1999/2000 
survey as the baseline data while the 2005/2006 survey as the post intervention observations. To 
explore the diverse channels of the impact of NAADS on food availability, sub samples on the 
basis of gender, rural/urban residence, regions and age groups are used in the analysis. 
The estimates show that NAADS participation increases the probability of having at least 
two meals per day by 6.6 percent in the OLS model and 7.1 percent in the FE model. The impact 
is stronger in female-headed households (the FE model indicates that NAADS increases the prob-
ability of ܯܧܣܮ by 12.3 percent).  To check for the robustness of the estimates, I apply alternative 
model specifications. Since the frequency of ܯܧܣܮ is count data, I employ a negative binomial 
regression (NB) which nests a Poisson model as the baseline model. In all the sub-sample groups, 
the NB regressions show that NAADS training increases the incidence rate ratio (IRR) of meals in 
participating households. 
Due to non-random assignment of households to the NAADS program, self-selection could 
influence the estimates obtained via OLS and FE. As a remedy, I use propensity score matching 
(PSM) in which ܯܧܣܮ is the outcome variable and NAADS membership/ or training is the treat-
ment. The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) is 0.062 and statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level in the full sample. This is pretty close to the OLS estimate and shows that 
NAADS participation increases food consumption by about 6.2 percent, ceteris paribus.  
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Therefore the finding is stable across model specifications and sample stratifications. The 
rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 contains a brief background on the NAADS 
program in Uganda. Section 4.3 is a review of previous studies on the impact of NAADS in 
Uganda. In section 4.4, I describe the empirical strategy while section 4.5  presents the dataset and 
key variables. In section 4.6, I discuss the results and robustness checks. The last section is the 
conclusion. 
 
4.2 Description of NAADS Program  
The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) program was established in 
Uganda by the NAADS Act (2001) as described in Nahdy (2004). It is a government program 
under the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAIF). It is one of the seven 
components of the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA) which in turn is part of Uganda's 
Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP).  
The main focus of NAADS is the provision of demand driven agricultural extension ser-
vices. According to NAADS Act (2001), the first objective is “to promote food security, nutrition 
and household incomes through increased productivity and market oriented farming.” Conse-
quently, the mission of NAADS is to scale up the provision of agricultural production information, 
technology development, identification of farmers needs and ensuring appropriate and affordable 
extension services. It emphasizes the participation of the poor and women in group decision mak-
ing process. The program replaced the traditional top-to-bottom approach of agricultural extension 
service provision. Under the program, farmers request for advisory services and technologies 
through groups. The program promotes intensive farming, specialization and commercialization 
of agriculture. 
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The main point of contact and procurement of agricultural technology takes place at the 
sub-county level where NAADS coordinators help farmer forums identify service needs and select 
enterprises as well as establish market linkages. Through focus group discussions, members of the 
farmer forum articulate their needs and participate in the selection of enterprise/technology and 
they choose the service providers/suppliers of farm inputs like seeds, livestock, pesticides, ferti-
lizers, and machinery. 
The sub-county administrators, farmers forum and service providers ensure implementa-
tion of agreed services. Funding is disbursed by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(MFPED) after plans prepared by farmer forums are approved. Monitoring of the of the contracted 
private service providers is done by the sub-county farmers groups and the NAADS coordinators. 
This is meant to control quality of service in accordance with NAADS operation guidelines 
At district levels, the district NAADS coordinator (DNC), the Chief Administrative Officer 
(CAO), Chief Finance Officer (CFO), auditors and agricultural scientists are responsible for im-
plementation. The NAADS district farmer forum brings all chairpersons of sub-county groups to-
gether and they liaise with district officials to ensure value for money in all procurements and 
NAADS service provisions. At the national level, NAADS falls under MAIF but is semi-autono-
mous and managed by a board and a secretariat. The secretariat formulates the implementation 
manual and monitors district and sub-county performances. 
Generally the implementation of NAADS follows a decentralized government structure 
with the majority of activities concentrated at the district and sub county levels. It is meant to be 
responsive to the needs of local farmers in a demand-driven setup. It was a complete change from 
a centralized agricultural extension model. Therefore, it is important to examine the impact of the 
program on key welfare indicators such as availability of food at the household level. 
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4.3 Literature Review  
There is a growing body of literature on the impact of agricultural programs in Uganda. 
NAADS in particular has attracted attention due to its bottom-up and demand-driven approach to 
agricultural extension service provision. It emphasizes farmer participation and service provider 
competition in agricultural extension. It is a World Bank loan supported program and most studies 
are concerned with increases in output and income.  
Whereas increases in agricultural production and farm income influences food security, 
adequate food intake is a necessary condition. Studies on household welfare such as Fafchamps et 
al. (2009), and Kennedy and Peters (1992) show that intra-household bargaining power influences 
nutritional status. Thus, it is probable that not every household member benefits equally from in-
creased farm output.  Tenenbaum (2008) suggests that diversion of food crops for sale is associated 
with food crises in many developing countries. This is because the head of a household may sell 
off marketable food crop harvests and leave little for home consumption amidst using the sale 
revenue to buy items which may not benefit all household members. NAADS also emphasizes 
commercialization of agriculture which may affect food crop production or the amount of harvest 
left for domestic consumption. Thus, it is of interest to analyze the impact of NAADS on food 
consumption in participating households. 
 This relates directly to MDG1 and Sustainable Development Goals 2 (eliminating hunger). 
In essence, this study contributes to the literature which analyzes strategies used to promote MDG1 
in Uganda. NAADS involves changes in the mode of delivery of agricultural extension services 
and it gives greater leverage to farmers in choosing the kind of agricultural technology they wish 
to adopt and the service provider. This is likely to encourage uptake of services and to create 
ownership of the program among farmers. In this way, it may increase agricultural productivity 
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and food availability. Thrupp (2000) suggests that agricultural development programs which uti-
lize local experiences and knowledge encourage technology adoption, therefore NAADS can pro-
mote food security due to the involvement of farmers in the design and implementation of the 
program. The major channels through which NAADS could affect food availability are adoption 
of better farming methods, use of high yielding crop varieties, and control of pests and diseases.  
A number of studies show that adoption of new farming technologies or seed varieties is 
associated with increases in farm output, revenue and food availability.  Mitti et al. (1997) find 
that participatory agricultural extension education and a seed loan scheme achieved wide coverage 
of farmers and expanded the use of better production systems in drought-prone maize growing 
areas of Zambia. In contrast, under NAADS, seeds as well as extension education is fully funded 
by the government. The role of farmers is to articulate their needs, select appropriate technology, 
and implement chosen animal or crop husbandry. This is equivalent to subsidization of agricultural 
production. If production is geared towards food crops, the program could improve food availabil-
ity and household consumption. 
However, intra-household inequality, may negatively affect food availability if cash crops 
are the main produce of the household. Studies such as Fafchamps et al. (2009) and O’Laughlin 
(2007) have shown that gender inequality is a complex issue in addressing consumption and pov-
erty issues in Africa. An increase in household income might not necessarily lead to improvement 
in the well-being of all members of the household.  Kennedy and Peters (1992) find that in Kenya 
and Malawi, calorific intake in a household is positively influenced by the proportion of the income 
controlled by women. Therefore the impact of increased farm output or income may not neces-
sarily mean improvement in welfare due to gender inequality. 
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In this study, the reported average number of meals in a household is used as an indicator 
of consumption which may shed light on food availability than fungible indicators such as income 
or farm output. There are studies which find that adoption of improved seed variety is associated 
with a reduction of poverty. For example, Kassie et al. (2011) examined the impact of improved 
groundnut varieties on income and poverty in Uganda. The study used cross-sectional data and 
propensity score matching methods and found that adopting improved groundnut varieties in-
creases income and reduces poverty.  
In a similar study using a different dataset, Kassie et al. (2014) find that adoption of im-
proved maize seed varieties significantly reduced the likelihood of chronic and transitory food 
insecurity in Tanzania.  Asfaw et al. (2012) studied the impact of adoption of improved pigeon pea 
technologies on poverty in Tanzania. They found that adoption of improved pigeon pea seed vari-
ety was associated with an increase in household consumption expenditures. This strand of litera-
ture indicates that improved seed varieties for food crops such as peas, maize and groundnuts can 
increase food availability.  The NAADS program, which provides extension services and inputs 
for both cash and food crops, could have a similar impact since seeds are part of the technologies 
to be chosen by farmer groups. 
Other studies such as Abdoulaye and Sanders (2005), Duflo et al. (2008), Teklewold et al. 
(2013), Khan et al. (2014), Thuo et al. (2014), and Abdulai and Huffman (2014) conclude that 
adoption of modern agricultural technology and fertilizers is associated with increased farm returns 
and improvement in household welfare. It is probable that NAADS, which emphasizes new tech-
nology adoption, can have a positive and significant impact on output and farm revenue income.  
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The preceding analysis shows that adoption of improved seed varieties and agricultural 
extension services can lead to higher farm yields and income. A few studies evaluated the impact 
of the NAADS program in Uganda.  Oleru et al. (2005) used randomly selected NAADS and non-
NAADS sub-counties in Northwestern Uganda to examine the adoption of new faming technolo-
gies. They found that in areas where NAADS was operational, farmers had better knowledge of 
animal and crop husbandry than in non-NAADS areas. In contrast, Benin et al. (2007) used a 
nationally representative dataset and found that NAADS participation is associated with mixed 
perception about food availability and nutritional quality of food. About 41-58 percent of NAADS 
participants reported improved welfare status but about 27 percent indicated that they were worse 
off than before the NAADS program was put in place. The same study showed that about 15 per-
cent of NAADS participants reported no change in their welfare.  
The mixed results show that the impact of NAADS on welfare indicators is somewhat am-
biguous.  One issue with the Benin et al. (2007) study is the use of households' perceptions about 
the present and past situations which depends on recall and can be influenced by other circum-
stances other than NAADS participation.  I posit that the evaluation of welfare on the basis of 
regular events such as the frequency of meals may provide additional insight into the program 
impact. 
In a follow-up study, Benin et al. (2011) used survey data, propensity score matching 
(PSM), and difference in difference methods to evaluate the impact of NAADS on household in-
come. The study found weak and mixed impacts of NAADS on farm yield and farm revenue. The 
sign and statistical significance were unstable across sample and sub-sample groupings. Their re-
sults could have been affected by sample size which was relatively small (400 observations). As a 
possible remedy, this study utilized a large nationally representative data set (the Uganda National 
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Household Survey). Amidst the unstable estimates, they also found that NAADS program partic-
ipation was associated with increased commercialization of farming which seemed to benefit male 
headed large household more than female headed households and crop farmers. This could nega-
tively influence food availability in male headed households with intra household inequality.  
A few studies show that NAADS did not have a statistically significant impact on farm 
output or household welfare. For instance, Okoboi et al. (2013) used UNHS data and differences-
in-difference regressions and found no statistically significant difference in crop yields and farm 
output. This is in contrast with earlier studies such as Benin et al. (2011) and Diiro and Sam (2015) 
which showed that NAADS had a positive impact on farm output. This suggests that the impact of 
NAADS remains unclear depending on methodology and sample used.  
The insignificant impact found in the study of Okoboi et al. (2013) could be due to the use 
of the 2005/06 and 2009 UNHS data. The period of their analysis covers the second phase of the 
NAADS program which was affected by a number of institutional problems. One particular prob-
lem is elite capture. This is documented in Feder et al. (2010) who found that educated and wealth-
ier farmers were favored in selection of farming technology and inputs. In such scenarios, the 
program would not benefit the poor and consequently the impact on poverty could be negligible.  
The literature reviewed suggest that changes in agricultural extension services can influ-
ence technology adoption, farm output and income. Studies which evaluated the impact of NAADS 
on welfare indicators showed mixed conclusions due to sample used and method of estimation. 
This study seeks to estimate the direct impact of NAADS on food consumption, an indicator of 
food security.  
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4.4 Econometric Strategy  
The empirical analysis follows a difference-in-difference set up and a linear probability 
model (LPM). Since the data points are for two periods, the fixed effects estimator is identical to 
the difference-in-difference estimator. I exploit the variation in NAADS participation across 
households and time. This enables me to identify the causal impact of the program with the as-
sumption of exogeneity of the NAADS program. I expect that households who received training 
or agricultural extension services under the NAADS program to have high farm yield. It is then 
plausible that such households would have more frequent food intake than those who did not par-
ticipate in the program. The dependent variable of interest is the average frequency of meals in a 
household per day. Since meal frequency is count data and is a bounded number, the dependent 
variable is redefined to make analysis insightful.  I created a dummy variable equal to one if a 
household always has at least two meal per day, otherwise the variable is equal to zero. 
 The benchmark of two meals a day is based on the World Food Program report which 
indicates that most Ugandan households normally have at least two meals in a day (WFP, 2013). 
The Uganda Bureau of Statistics also considers households which have less than 2 meals a day as 
having insufficient food intake (UBOS, 2016).  Secondly, many Ugandan rural households do 
without breakfast but most strive to have at least lunch or dinner or both as shown in Acham et al. 
(2012).  
For clarity the unit of analysis are households and the estimable equation is specified as:  
ݕ௜௦௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܰܣܣܦܵ + ∑ ߙ௞ܺ௞௜௦௧ ௄௞ୀଵ + ݀௦ + ߭௧ +  ݀௦ ∗ ߭௧ + ߝ௜௦௧                                          (4.1) 
Where ݕ௜௦௧  is equal to one if household ݅ in district ݏ at time ݐ had at least two meals in a day but 
zero otherwise. NAADS is a dummy variable equal to one if a household was trained by NAADS 
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officials or was visited by NAADS extension workers but zero otherwise. The coefficient of inter-
est is ߚଵ and it measures the impact of agricultural extension on the likelihood of having at least 
two meals per day. ܺ is a vector of controls which includes household characteristics such as 
household head's age, gender, education, household size, size of farmland owned, farm income, 
farm input purchases, type of cooking fuel and type of residence (urban/rural). My choice of the 
controls is motivated by previous research on nutrition such as Harnack et al. (1998), Maxwell et 
al. (1998), Ouedraogo (2006), and Hammons and Fiese (2011).  
 The stochastic term as part of the data generating process is represented by ߝ௜௦௧ . I also 
include district fixed effects (݀௦) and time fixed effects (߭௧) in the model. The parameters are 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with clustered robust errors. The use of OLS (LPM) 
is sometimes criticized for a number of weakness but it gives very good estimates of marginal 
effects (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
 
4.5  Data  
The data used in this study comes from the Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) which 
was conducted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics in 1999/2000 and 2005/2006. The 1999/2000 
UNHS covered a sample of 10,700 households which were observed between August 1999 and 
July 2000. The UNHS 2005/06 was conducted from May 2005 to April 2006 and covered about 
7,400 households. The 1999/2000 and the 2005/2006 UNHS does not have a panel structure but 
are appended together as repeated cross sections. The dataset contains information on socioeco-
nomic characteristics of households, enterprises, and agriculture as well as community level data. 
The questionnaires for each survey were continually expanded to cover new issues and develop-
ment programs and hence suitable for program evaluation.  
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The surveys are designed in such a way that the data is nationally representative. The da-
taset contains sample weights which are useful in correcting standard errors as discussed in Kott 
(1991). The first stage sampling frame for the surveys were obtained from a preceding national 
census. In the socioeconomic and agricultural module of the UNHS, for each district, the first stage 
of sampling involves a random draw of parishes within a district. The second stage involves a 
random selection of villages from chosen parishes. The final stage involves a random selection of 
households to whom a detailed questionnaire is administered. Each district is also stratified into 
rural and urban groups to make the sample representative. In the sampling design, a household is 
defined as a group of people who normally live and eat together. This may consist of the head of 
the household, spouse and children. Households are the units of analysis for this study, hence some 
individual level variables which influence welfare are aggregated to the household level. These 
include income, loans and farmland owned as individuals. 
The dependent variable of interest is a measure of food availability and specifically, the 
average number of meals   a household always have per day. While chronic hunger is on the decline 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, food insecurity and low intake is still a challenge in Uganda (Vella et al. 
1992 and Nakabo-Ssewanyana, 2003). For this reason, I use availability of food as a measure of 
food security. To facilitate intuitive interpretation of the impact of NAADS, a binary variable is 
constructed to indicate whether the levels of food intake is below or meets the minimum threshold 
of two meals per day. The major explanatory variable is participation in the NAADS program. 
Data on participation in NAADS is contained in the data set as dummy variables and frequency of 
visits by extension workers.  
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During the survey, the field interviewers elicited responses on the number of times an ag-
ricultural extended worker visited the household, household’s membership of a NAADS farmers 
group and their participation in making agricultural technology selection and procurement deci-
sions. This is the treatment variable whose effect on household food availability is tested. A num-
ber of control variables such as household size, land tenure system, age and gender of household 
head, income, and education, among others are extracted from the survey data and included in the 
analysis. A description of how the variables are measured is contained in Table 11.  
Summary statistics of the variables are displayed in Table 12 and it checks for differences 
in means of the dependent and control variables. The sample is divided into NAADS and non-
NAADS sub-samples. The mean number of meals per day is 2.38 and 1.69 among the NAADS 
and non-NAADS households respectively. The difference in the mean number of meals is statisti-
cally significant and indicates that NAADS might have impacted food availability. The mean daily 
food expenditure is about 9,990 Uganda shilling (UGX) for non-NAADS households but it is about 
UGX 14,000 for NAADS households. This could be due to the differences in farm revenue as 
NAADS households have a mean farm revenue of UGX 200,000 compared to UGX 35,000 for 
non-NAADS participants.  
The mean expenses on farm inputs such as fertilizers, seeds and the number of farm work-
ers are also statistically different between the sub samples. This could be due to adoption of better 
technologies such as improved seed varieties and intense farming methods. In the regression anal-
yses, the independent variables with statistically significant differences in means are controlled 
for. 
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4.6 Results  
Table 13 presents the estimates of the effect of the NAADS program on food availability 
with a modification in equation 4.1 that excludes ݀௦ , ߭௧ , and ݀௧* ߭௧ . This is the linear probability 
model (OLS) and the estimate of interest is ߚ1. It indicates the change in probability of having at 
least two meals in a day, conditional on receiving agricultural extension service through the 
NAADS program. In all the estimations, sample weights are applied to ensure representativeness 
of the results. Clustered robust standard errors are used to correct for possible heteroscedasticity. 
The results in Columns (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) are obtained from different sub-sample groups. 
Column (1) of Table 13 contains OLS estimates from the full sample and it shows that 
participation in NAADS is associated with a 6.8 percent increase in the probability of a household 
having at least two meals per day. The estimate is statistically different from zero and the overall 
goodness of fit with R-squared of 0.32 is good for cross sectional data. Other farm related controls 
such as utilization of improved seed varieties, farm labor and farm revenue also increase the prob-
ability of having at least two meals a day. 
The estimates in Column (2) are obtained from a sample with male headed households 
only. The estimate of ߚଵ is 0.081 which shows that in male headed households, participation in the 
NAADS program increases the probability of having two meals a day by 8.1 percent. The magni-
tude is higher compared to the full sample which suggests that gender plays a role in the effective-
ness of the program. The estimate from the female headed household sub-sample shows that the 
program does not have a statistically significant impact on food consumption and is not reported.  
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In Column (3) I present estimates from the rural household sub-sample. This is to test the 
impact of NAADS in the targeted rural areas. Although some Ugandan households practice urban 
agriculture as reported in Maxwell et al. (1998), on the other hand, Mukwaya et al. (2010) suggest 
that Uganda has a low urbanization rate of 13 percent. This implies that NAADS participation 
would be more beneficial to the rural households than urban dwellers. Therefore, it is informative 
to consider the rural sub-sample separately. The OLS estimate in Column (3) shows that NAADS 
is associated with a 6.5 percent increase in the probability that a household had at least two meals 
a day. The estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level. This suggests that supporting 
rural households with agricultural extension services can improve food availability, even at a sub-
sistence farming level as discussed in Aliber and Hart (2009).  
The estimate from the urban households is statistically insignificant and is not reported. 
The statistically insignificant estimate is plausible since most urban households derive their live-
lihood from paid employment or retail business. The estimates in Column (4) are for households 
headed by a person aged 60 years or older. This is meant to test if the program effective among an 
older and possibly vulnerable age group.  The estimate indicates NAADS program increases the 
probability of food availability by 14 percent if the age of the household head is greater than or 
equal to 60 years. This is plausible since most retired household heads engage in agriculture and 
could give more time to farming than working-age population who are attracted to white collar 
jobs. 
The results displayed in Table 14 are obtained from regionally stratified sub-samples. This 
is meant to test regional variation in the impact of NAADS on food availability. The estimates are 
obtained from OLS regressions of equation 1 but without ݀௦ , ߭௧ , and ݀௧* ߭௧ terms. The results 
indicate that NAADS extension service is associated with 9.8 and 9.6 percent increases in the 
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probability of a household having at least two meals per day in Central and Eastern regions re-
spectively. There is no statistically significant impact in Northern and Western regions. The insig-
nificant estimate for Northern Uganda could be attributed to civil war which affected agricultural 
production over the period when data was collected (Tusiime et al. 2013). The insignificant impact 
in the Western region could be explained by the fact that it is the region with lowest level of poverty 
(Appleton, 2003). Hence, participation in NAADS may not change the frequency of meals if 
households are already food secure.  
 The estimates displayed in Table 15 are obtained from district fixed effects regressions. It 
is necessary to apply a fixed effects (FE) regression because there could have been changes over 
time and within districts which affected food availability to the households. This is premised on 
the fact that implementation of NAADS varied across districts. Applying fixed effects regressions 
also accounts for unobserved district characteristics which influence agriculture and food availa-
bility. 
The estimator absorbs ancillary district specific intercepts and computes clustered robust 
standard errors. Column (1) of Table 15 contains estimates from the full sample and shows that 
NAADS is associated with a 7.1 percent increase in the probability of having at least two meals 
per day. The estimates displayed in Column (2) are obtained from the subsample of only female 
headed households. The result show that in female headed households, participation in NAADS 
program increases the probability of food consumption by 12.3 percent. This is large compared to 
all the other specifications and indicates that women play a significant role in promoting household 
welfare and food security (Valdivia, 2001, Ajani et al. 2009, and Hyder et al. 2007). 
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 Columns (3) and (4) of Table 15 are estimates for male headed households and rural house-
holds as separate sub-samples respectively. In the two sub-samples, NAADS increases the likeli-
hood of food consumption by 6.2 and 6.9 percent respectively. Column (5) contains   estimates 
from the sub-sample for elderly household heads. However the estimate is statistically insignifi-
cant.   
Table 16 repeats the FE analysis but with samples stratified by regions. The evidence sug-
gests that NAADS increases the likelihood of a household having at least two meals per day by 
8.9 percent in the Central region but insignificant for Eastern and Northern regions. Overall, the 
FE estimates show that the NAADS program positively influences household food consumption 
in the participating households. The R-squared for the FE estimates are higher in comparison to 
the naive OLS model results. 
   4.6.1 Robustness Check   To check for the robustness of the OLS and FE estimates, I perform additional analysis 
using negative binomial (NB) regressions and propensity score matching (PSM). The NB analy-
sis is premised on the fact that the frequency of meals is measured as count data and the distribu-
tion is skewed to the right as illustrated in Figure 6. This could affect the results and statistical 
inference in OLS regressions which assumes normal distributions. The estimates from the NB 
regressions are based on the density function: 
݂(ݕ௜|ݔ௜) = ୻൫௬೔ାఈషభ൯௬೔!୻(ఈషభ) ቀ ఈ
షభ
ఈషభାఓ೔ቁ
ఈషభ ቀ ఈషభఈషభାఓ೔ቁ
௬೔ , ݕ௜ = 0,1,2,3, . ..                                                 (4.2) 
Where ݕ௜   denotes the number of meals a household has per day, ߙ is the dispersion parameter, 
and ߤ௜  is the mean.  
103  
The maximum likelihood estimator computes the condition mean,ॱሾܻ|ܺሿ = exp (ܺᇱߚመ), 
from which a column vector of coefficients is obtained. District and time trends are controlled for 
and the results are presented in Table 17. The estimates are the incidence rate ratio (IRR), which 
is the relative difference in the frequency of meals conditional on NAADS program and other 
controls. For the full sample, NAADS increases the incidence of meals in a household by 1.05 
times relative to the households which did not benefit from the program. The IRR is 1.09 and 1.07 
for the male headed households and rural households respectively. The estimates are statistically 
significant at the one percent level and the likelihood ratio test indicates that the model fits the data 
well. Overall, the NB regressions show that NAADS positively influences the average frequency 
of meals in households which participated in the program. 
Although the UNHS dataset was obtained through random sampling, the assignment of 
households to the NAADS program was not. Households who were willing to form farmer groups 
self-selected themselves into the program. This could make the OLS and FE estimates biased and 
inconsistent. As a remedy, I extend the analysis to include Propensity Score Matching (PSM). 
Assuming selection on observables, households can be paired based on similar propensity scores. 
The PSM method summarizes the pre-treatment observable characteristics of each subject into a 
single index variable, and then uses the propensity score to match similar individuals (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983). The PSM is the probability of assignment to treatment conditional on observable 
characteristics such that ݌ݎ(ܰܣܣܦܵ =  1|ܺ)  =  ܨ (. ), where ܨ (. ) is a cumulative density func-
tion. For this analysis, the measure of interest is the average treatment effect on the treated (ܣܶܶ) 
defined as:  ॱ  (ܯ௜ଵหܰܣܣܦܵ =  1;  ܺ) − ॱ (ܯ௜଴หܰܣܣܦܵ =  1;  ܺ).                                                      (4.3) 
Where ܯ is a dummy variable which indicate that a household had at least two meals per day. The 
superscripts 1 and 0 denote the treated and control groups respectively.  
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The ATT estimator relies on the overlap assumption, which requires that each unit of ob-
servation has a positive probability of being treated (NAADS) or untreated. If the assumption is 
violated, the ATT estimate would be spurious. The assumption is checked by plotting the proba-
bility of getting treated or untreated. The kernel density plots in Figure 7 show that the overlap 
assumption is not violated. The ATT estimate from the PSM regression using common support is 
displayed in Table 18. The pseudo R-squared after matching are also very low. The ݌-values for 
the likelihood ratio test of joint significance of the independent variables indicates that there is no 
systematic difference in the distribution of independent variables between the treated and untreated 
groups after matching. 
From the full sample, the ATT is 0.062 which indicates that participation in NAADS in-
creases the probability of a household having at least two meals per day by 6.2 percent. In the rural 
sub-sample, the ATT is 0.06 and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The magnitude of 
the ATT is comparable with the average marginal effects presented in Table 13 and fixed effects 
estimates in Table 15. However, the ATT is statistically insignificant for the urban and female 
headed households. The overall impact of the program is positive in all the specifications and close 
to the OLS and FE specifications.  
Therefore, NAADS participation increases the frequency food consumption in Uganda. 
Since the results are robust to specification changes and sub-sample groups, they suggest that ag-
ricultural extension services can be an effective strategy to reduce food insecurity in Uganda. The 
plausible mechanism is via adoption of better farming technologies and farm inputs which influ-
ences farm productivity and hence food availability.  
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4.7  Conclusion  
This study examined the impact of agricultural extension services on household welfare 
measured by the average frequency of meals in households in Uganda. Data for the analysis was 
obtained from the Uganda National Household Surveys which were conducted in 1999/2000 and 
2005/2006.  A linear probability model and fixed effects estimators are the major methods of esti-
mation. The results show that agricultural extension service under the NAADS program increases 
the probability of a household having at least two meals in a day. Since the frequency of meals is 
count data, a negative binomial regression is used as an additional method of analysis. The negative 
binomial regression results indicate that NAADS increases the incidence of meals in the partici-
pating households, all else constant. Due to the non-experimental nature of the data used in the 
analysis, a propensity score-matching model was used to control for self-selection bias. After 
matching the households on the basis of similar propensity scores, the average treatment effect for 
the treated shows that NAADS increases food intake. 
In all the analyses, the sample was stratified by gender, rural-urban residence, regional and 
age groupings. The linear probability model estimates are statistically significant in the gender, 
rural and age stratified sub-samples. In terms of region, the program seems more effective in the 
Eastern and Central regions. The statistically insignificant impact in the Northern region could be 
attributed to war which affected agriculture (McElroy et al. 2012). The fixed effects estimator, 
which exploits district fixed effects and district time trends, shows that participation in the NAADS 
program increases the probability of frequent meals by about 7 percent in all the sub-samples. But 
the results from regionally stratified data indicate that NAADS has a statistically significant impact 
in the Central and Western regions.  
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Overall, the findings in this study show that agricultural extension services and involve-
ment of farmers in the selection of agricultural production technologies can be a strategy for food 
security and poverty reduction in developing countries. A mechanism which encourages partici-
pation of rural households to demand and utilize agricultural extension services may encourage 
adoption of modern farming techniques. The positive impact of improved seed varieties indicates 
that extension services, which includes provision of farm inputs, can be used to combat food inse-
curity.  
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Table 11:  Description of Variables 
Variable  Description  Meals Daily average number  of meals reported by a household Conflict Area  A dummy variable equal to 1 if  was affected by civil strife  Food Expenses  Food expenditure measured in Uganda Shillings Hhsize  Number of people who usually live in a household. Hhage Age of household head Hhgender Gender of household head (Male=1, Female=0) Disability  Does household head have any disability? (Yes=1, No=0 Literacy Ability to read and write (Yes=1, No=0) Marital Status  Is household married? ( Married, Separated, Divorced, Single, Widowed) House Tenure Type of house tenure( Owned/free or rented) Cooking fuel What household uses for cooking ( Charcoal, electricity, gas, firewood) Devt program Did the household benefit from other development program (Yes=1, N0=0) Migrant Did the household migrate to the current location ( Yes=1, No=0) Income Total Household income in Uganda Shillings Farm Labor Number of people who work on the household farmland Farm revenue Total revenue from sale of farm products Farm Input  Value Amount of money spent of farm implements, fertilizers, seeds Improved Seeds Planting of high yield maize variety (Yes=1, No=0)                        
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Table 12:  Summary Statistics Showing Differences in Means 
Variable  NT. Obs NT. Mean(X) T. Obs T. Mean (Y) Differences (Y-X) Meal frequency  9991 1.69 177 2.38 0.689** Conflict Area  10824 0.09 177 0.07 -0.03 Food expense  10152 9983.63 177 14000 3500*** Hhsize  9873 5.26 176 6.14 0.875*** Hhage  10159 43.05 177 44.51 1.47 Hhgender  10824 0.696 177 0.791 0.095*** devt program  10824 0.06 177 0.03 0.03 Migrant  10824 0.66 177 0.94 0.283*** Income  10277 1,400,000 166 1,500,000 74,000 Farm labor  7978 4.67 176 10.68 6.017*** Farm revenue  8689 35,000 177 200,000 170,000*** Farm Input Values  7773 30,000 156 71,000 4,1000** Improved Seeds  10824 0.10 177  0.73 0.633*** Notes: * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Obs is the number of observations. NT denotes households which were not recipients of extension services under the NAADS program while T are NAADS   participants. Y= Mean from NAADS households. X= Mean from non-NAADS households. For dummy variables, the means or differences indicate proportions. Devt program indicates other development programs other than NAADS which provide agricultural extension services to households. This may include interventions im-plemented by non-governmental organizations                         
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Table 13:  The Impact of NAADS on having at least 2 Meals per Day 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) NAADS 0.066** 0.081*** 0.065** 0.14***  (0.028) (0.092) (0.031) (0.037) Improved Seeds 0.094*** 0.105*** 0.101*** 0.028  (0.019) (0.024) (0.021) (0.037) Owned/Free House 0.153*** 0.150*** 0.167*** 0.219*  (0.032) (0.038) (0.033) (0.117) Charcoala 0.122*** 0.134*** 0.187*** 0.171**  (0.033) (0.039) (0.034) (0.078) Electricitya 0.149*** 0.264* 0.671***   (0.055) (0.134) (0.079)  Literateb 0.108*** 0.102*** 0.113*** 0.079  (0.0176) (0.0193) (0.0168) (0.0492) Disability -0.068** -0.083** -0.064* -0.063  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) Farm Labor 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.032***  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) Hhage -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001  (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.002) hhsize  0.009*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.002  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) Constant 0.494*** 0.528*** 0.491*** 0.640***  (0.0484) (0.0514) (0.0484) (0.167) Other Controlsc  YES YES YES YES R-squared 0.324 0.326 0.324 0.368 Observations  6653 5217 6269 1334  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. OLS is the method of estimation 
with the dependent variable defined as a dummy variable. (1) Full sample, (2) Male headed households, (3) 
rural households, (4) household head aged 18-60 years and (5) household aged 60+ years. The estimated 
coefficient of NAADS in the female headed household and urban household sub-samples are statistically 
insignificant and are not reported here. The estimates are average marginal effects. aUsed for cooking in the 
household relative to firewood as base case. b Can the head of household read and write? It is a dummy 
variable used as proxy for education.  cFarm revenue, household income, main source of water for domestic 
use, farm input expenses 
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Table 14:  The Impact of NAADS on having at least 2 Meals per Day by Region 
VARIABLES Central East North West NAADS 0.098*** 0.096** 0.104 0.050  (0.027) (0.035) (0.083) (0.067) Improved Seeds 0.052 0.117*** 0.129** -0.006  (0.039) (0.036) (0.054) (0.033) Polygamous -0.018 -0.091*** -0.150*** -0.161***  (0.022) (0.028) (0.050) (0.038) Never Married -0.384*** -0.157*** -0.238*** -0.199***  (0.121) (0.054) (0.081) (0.026) Owned/Free House -0.002 0.132*** 0.198** 0.171***  (0.019) (0.042) (0.070) (0.059) Charcoala 0.034 0.080** 0.108 0.168**  (0.046) (0.038) (0.065) (0.073) Electricitya 0.109** -0.430 0.113** 0.151***  (0.037) (0.310) (0.052) (0.040) Literateb -0.007 0.101*** 0.140*** 0.153***  (0.035) (0.012) (0.030) (0.033) Farm Labor -0.006 0.024*** 0.013*** 0.036***  (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0034) Hhage -0.0014 -0.0016*** -0.0014* -0.001  (0.001) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.0008) Hhsize -0.000 0.007** 0.004 0.010**  (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) Constant 0.007*** 0.584*** 0.546*** 0.328***  (0.098) (0.060) (0.086) (0.0575) Other Controlsc YES YES YES  YES R-Squared 0.080 0.264 0.183 0.518 Number of Observations 317 2,215 1,500 2,605  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. OLS is the method of estimation with the dependent variable defined as a dummy variable. The estimates are average marginal effects. aUsed for cooking in the household relative to firewood as the base case.b Can the head of household read and write ? It is a dummy variable used as a proxy for education.c Farm revenue, household income, main source of water for domestic use, and farm input          
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 Table 15:  The Impact of NAADS on having at least 2 Meals per Day (FE) 
VARIABLES  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) NAADS 0.071*** 0.123** 0.062*** 0.069*** 0.045  (0.021) (0.049) (0.023) (0.021) (0.063) Improved Seeds -0.007 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.130**  (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)  (0.017) (0.049) Farm Labor 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.005  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.02) Migration -0.03* -0.042** -0.042** -0.026 -0.106**  (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.041) Hhage -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.002) Hhsize 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.012***  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) Constant -0.077*** -0.075** 0.563*** 0.006 0.647***  (0.028) (0.034) (0.021) (0.027) (0.146) Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES District Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES District Time Trends YES YES YES YES YES Other controls YES YES YES YES YES R-squared 0.469 0.515 0.473 0.468 0.554 Number of Observations 6,653 1,436 5,217 6,269 1,161 Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.  Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. The results in the columns are for different sub-samples. Column (1) is the full sample,  Column (2) consists of male headed households, Column (3)  is for female headed households,  Column (4) is for rural households, and Column (5) is the sample for  households whose head  is aged  60 years and above.  The dependent variable is defined as a dummy variable indicating a household always has at least 2 meals per day. The estimates are average marginal effects. Other controls includes marital status, education, farm revenue, household in-come, type of fuel used for cooking, and main source of water for domestic use.               
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Table 16:  Fixed Effects Regressions by Region 
VARIABLES Central Eastern Northern Western NAADS 0.089*** 0.0148 0.147 0.076*  (0.025) (0.015) (0.120) (0.038) Improved Seeds 0.045 -0.044** -0.0036 -0.0312  (0.043) (0.019) (0.045) (0.03) Farm labor -0.009 0.001 0.007** -0.004  (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Migrant  0.003 -0.022 -0.067* 0.005  (0.0349) (0.0207) (0.0367) (0.0321) Hhage -0.002 -0.001*** -0.002* -0.000  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) hhsize -0.001 0.0105*** 0.005 0.009**  (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) Constant 0.030*** 0.240*** 0.582*** 0.614***  (0.0846) (0.0375) (0.0709) (0.0364) Other Controls  YES YES YES YES Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES District Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES District Time Trends  YES YES YES YES R-squared 0.162 0.378 0.278 0.631 Number of Observations 317 2,215 1,500 2,605 Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.  Sample weights are applied in all the estimations. The dependent variable is defined as a dummy variable. The estimates are average marginal effects. Other controls includes marital status, education, farm revenue, household in-come, type of fuel used for cooking, and main source of water for domestic use.               
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Table 17:  Robustness Check Using Negative Binomial Regression 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) NAADS 1.05** 1.09*** 1.073*** 1.08* 0.118  (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.052) (0.221) Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES District Fixed  Effects YES YES YES YES YES District Time Trends YES YES YES YES YES Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES Number of Observations 6,632 5,201 6,240 5,318 1,314  Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients are incidence rate ratios (IRR). The IRR indicates the number of times a household which benefited from NAADS service is more likely to have a meal in a day compared to non-NAADS beneficiaries, holding other variables constant. Other controls includes marital status, education, farm revenue, household income, type of fuel used for cooking, and main source of water for domestic use. Column (1) is the full sample, Column (2) is for male headed household, and Column (3) is a sub-sample for rural areas. Columns (4) and (5) are for household heads aged 18-60 and 60+ respectively.                      
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Table 18:  Robustness Check Using Propensity Score Matching 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) NAADS (ATT) 0.062*** 0.054** 0.06** 0.084 0.075  (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.06) (0.026) Matched Observations (N) 1,645 1,228 1,489 402 150 Pseudo R-squared  after matching 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.009 ߯ଶ p-values after matching  0.983 0.421 0.80 0.976 0.86  Notes. ***p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients are Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) and indicates the difference in the probability of a household having at least 2 meals per day conditional on NAADS. The propensity score was estimated using logit and on common supports. The pseudo R-squared after matching indicates how much the variation in NAADS participation can be attributed to observables. The p-values for the likelihood-ratio test checks whether the observed difference in model fit for the treated and untreated is statistically significant. All regressions include district fixed effects and controls as described in Table 11. The sample consist of observations contained in the 2005/2006 survey only.                            
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  Figure 6: Daily Food Consumption 
Source: author’s computation                
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 Figure 7:   Probability Plots to Check Overlap Assumption 
Notes: The kernel density plots are used to check whether the overlap assumption for propensity score matching is satisfied or violated. The overlap assumption is satisfied if the likelihood of finding observations in both the control and the treatment groups given all possible combinations of covariates values.  A violation of the overlap assumption would make it difficult to account for the effects of unobserved outcomes. The figures above show the overlap assumption is not violated as the propensity scores are between zero and one and the kernel density overlaps most of the time.     
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Chapter 5: Synthesis and General Conclusions 
 5.1 Conclusions 
The dissertation examined three health and development issues related to the Millennium 
Development Goals/ Sustainable Development Goals. The dissertation is motivated by the persis-
tent poor health and development indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa. A number of strategies have 
been applied to help African countries achieve economic growth so that they can address develop-
ment bottlenecks. The strategies include Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), the Highly In-
debted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, and project tied loans.  
In the first essay, I examined the impact of the HIPC Initiative on under-five mortality rate 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The findings indicate that countries which participated in the HIPC Initi-
ative experienced a statistically significant reduction in under-five mortality rate. This is explained 
by the conditionality of the Initiative which required that for a country to benefit, it must come up 
with strategies to reduce poverty and improve social service provision. It is probable that the con-
ditionality led to improvement in healthcare service provision and hence impacted the cause of 
child mortality.  
The requirement to allocate more resources to social services, including the health sector 
could have mediated the observed changes in child mortality rate in the participating countries.  
From this essay, one can conclude that the debt relief effort spearheaded by the World Bank, IMF, 
African Development, and the Jubilee 2000 coalition led to some improvements in health out-
comes in SSA. This indicates debt relief and/ or development aid with conditionality can yield 
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positive outcomes.  This is in sharp contrast with arguments that conditionality is bad. Aid without 
conditionality and monitoring breeds inefficiencies and corruption. Therefore, international devel-
opment organizations and industrialized countries can help Sub-Saharan Africa achieve the sus-
tainable development goals through tied aid which improves social service provision and poverty 
reduction.  
Due to the poor economic performance of many developing countries in the 1980s, the 
IMF designed and implemented the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). The program involved 
liberalization of many sectors of the economy and a reduction in the roles of governments.  In 
Uganda, social services such as healthcare, which used to be provided by the government and not-
for-profit organizations was liberalized. As a result many private hospitals and clinics were estab-
lished as for-profit businesses, notwithstanding the fact that provision of healthcare services in-
volves a high degree of information asymmetry. As a consequence, poor regulation of a liberalized 
healthcare sector could   propagate supplier-induced demand for some services. A notable case is 
the increase in the rate of cesarean section births. Given information asymmetry and complications 
associated with child delivery, profit oriented hospitals may find it lucrative to recommend it to 
expectant mothers.  This is the research problem analyzed in the second essay.  I examined the 
impact of private hospitals on the likelihood of cesarean sections in Uganda. Using a bivariate 
probit method, the impact of place of delivery is identified. This is the first study which empirically 
examined the phenomenon of physician induced-demand in an African country. The results indi-
cate the need for closer monitoring of private hospitals so that expectant mothers are protected 
from physician induced-demand. Patients also need to be educated about their rights so that they 
can make informed decisions. This can protect expectant mothers from maternal health problems 
associated with cesarean section births.   
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The third essay examined the impact of agricultural extension services on household food 
consumption.  The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) is a World Bank funded 
project which provides demand-driven agricultural extension services and farm inputs in Uganda. 
It is a change from the top-to-bottom agricultural extension service model.  The program aimed at 
increasing agricultural productivity and improving household income and food security. The pro-
gram required farmer group formation as a means of accessing the service. As a consequence, 
some households formed groups and received agricultural extension services while others did not 
benefit. This creates a good condition for evaluating the effectiveness of the program.  The impact 
of the program on household food consumption is directly related to the Millennium Development 
Goal number 1 and the Sustainable Development Goal number 2.   
Previous studies examined the impact of NAADS on technology adoption, farm output, 
farm income and a composite measure of poverty. However, I consider the impact of NAADS on 
food consumption as an end in itself. This is because increases in farm output and income may not 
translate into improvement in household welfare due to intra-household inequality in decision 
making and resource allocation.  On the other hand, food consumption is relatively uniform within 
a household and hence a more direct measure of the impact of NAADS on one indicator of welfare. 
The findings indicate that membership and training under NAADS improves food availability and 
consumption. Thus, it helps in reducing hunger and hence promotes achievement of MDG 1/ SDG 
2.  The main takeaway from this chapter is that demand driven agricultural extension services can 
be an effective strategy in fighting hunger and rural poverty. Therefore, decentralized and partici-
patory agricultural extension services should be promoted. 
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5.2 Future Research  
Given the findings from these three essays, future studies could focus on related issues 
such as debt sustainability in countries which benefited from the HIPC initiative. This is because 
the initiative was a temporary measure to reduce debt obligations but it also opened new avenues 
to borrow funds at concessional rates. As much as concessional loans carry low interest rates, some 
HIPCs contracted huge loans after receiving debt relief. As a result, the total debt stock may pile 
up again, leading to a vicious cycle of indebtedness, high debt servicing,   crowding out of public 
good provision, poor health services, adverse health outcomes, low labor productivity, low eco-
nomic growth and the need to borrow more, ad infinitum.  Thus, it may be informative to analyze 
the impact of the HIPC Initiative on debt sustainability.  
From the essay on physician induced-demand for cesarean section births in Uganda, future 
research may consider the impact of insurance on cesarean section birth rates. The increase in the 
number of private hospitals/clinics in Uganda has created a market for health insurance and the 
Uganda government has proposed a national health insurance scheme which shall require contri-
butions from individuals employed in the formal sector.  Physician induced-demand might impose 
a financial burden on the scheme. A study which analyzes the utilization of healthcare services 
financed by private insurance may produce evidence which can be used to plug loopholes in the 
proposed national health insurance scheme.  
Future studies on food security and agricultural extension could consider demonstration 
effects.  The households which did not receive training but live in the neighborhoods of farmers 
who were trained by extension workers could have an incentive to adopt new farming methods. A 
random sample of such households and those who lived far from trained farmers can be used to 
estimate demonstration effects on farm productivity and household welfare. 
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